The strategic use of small scale water providers : an analysis of private-sector participation in peri-urban Maputo by Bhatt, Jigar D. (Jigar Dinker)
The Strategic Use of Small Scale Water Providers: An Analysis of
Private-Sector Participation in Peri-Urban Maputo
By
Jigar D. Bhatt
B.S. in Economics
Northeastern University
Boston, Massachusetts (2001)
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master in City Planning
at the
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
June 2006
© 2006 Jigar D. Bhatt. All Rights Reserved.
The author hereby grants to MIT permission to reproduce and distribute publicly paper and
electronic copies of this thesis document in whole or in part.
Author
76) Department of Urban Studies and Planning
k (May 24, 2006)
Certified by
Professor Jennifer Davis
Visiting sistant Professor, Stanford University
Faculty Affiliate, Department of Urban Studies and Planning
Thesis Supervisor
Accepted by
MASSACRUSIN ik E,
OF TECHNOLOGY
OCT 2 6 2006
LIBRARIES
Professor Langley Keyes
Chair, MCP Committee
Department of Urban Studies and Planning
ROTCH

The Strategic Use of Small Scale Water Providers: An Analysis of
Private-Sector Participation in Peri-Urban Maputo
by
Jigar D. Bhatt
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning
on May 25, 2006 in partial fulfillment for the requirements
for the degree of Master in City Planning
ABSTRACT
During Portuguese colonial rule biased service provision throughout the 20th century resulted
in a city that today has spatially segregated water services distinguishable along racial lines. In 1975,
a newly independent Mozambique lacked the financial and human resources necessary to extend its
utility network to peri-urban residents. Water coverage rates and service levels could not keep up
with population growth. Donor agencies and policymakers gave a great deal of attention to large
scale-private sector participation but it was unable to overcome Maputo's infrastructure challenges.
Today, less than 40 percent of Maputo residents have access to the utility network. Maputo's 'other
private sector' - small, informal private-sector providers (SPSP) - serve over 150,000 residents with
reliable standpipes and private connections and have contributed significantly to coverage goals.
Sector planners knew less, however, about how they could contribute to future sector goals. This
study aims to answer that question through a detailed analysis of their cost and price structures,
investment profiles, and operating environment. We find that Maputo's SPSPs already contribute
significantly to the sector's coverage, service, and financial sustainability goals. They should be
viewed as an integral part of Maputo's water delivery system and not 'a problem' like much of the
literature brands them. Their operations can be made more efficient, affordable, and
environmentally sustainable with the appropriate policy and business interventions. We recommend
actively promoting larger SPSPs, universal metering, improved electricity supply, reducing costs
associated with water pumps, and taxation and regulatory measures so ISNOs can contribute to all
sector goals as planning moves forward.
Thesis Supervisor: Jennifer Davis
Title: Faculty Affiliate, Department of Urban Studies and Planning, MIT
Visiting Assistant Professor, Institute for the Environment, Stanford University
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A REVASCULARIZATION
The pumps at the Umbeluzi,
Fill this system's heart.
Its plasma pulses through arteries,
Spread across the cement city.
The bloodthirsty asphalt,
Ensures an abrupt halt,
The colonists stalled,
What the mighty pumps start.
This peri-urban mass,
A gangrenous expanse,
A result of prejudice,
In basic services.
Amid ideological confusion,
Donors came with their overseas solution,
Large corporate collusion premeditated
a lifesaving transfusion.
The transfusion was Type A,
But Maputo is Type 0,
Indigenous residents still rely on an archipelago.
In an act of regeneration,
Came a new per-urban occupation.
Surgeons of a pockmarked earth,
Try to alleviate their neighbors' thirst...
The system meanwhile still searches,
For the perfect nurse.
-The author
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CHAPTER 1:
PRIVATE-SECTOR PARTICIPATION IN THE WATER AND SANITATION
SECTOR IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
1. 1 INTRODUCTION
Fast growing cities in developing countries - many of them former colonies - are currently
facing an infrastructure crisis. Colonial policy concentrated on national resource extraction through
small, well developed urban centers, "Colonialism everywhere resulted in the dispossession and
exploitation of the indigenous population in the interest of metropolitan finance capital" (Bennoune,
1977). This metropolitan capital obliterated the traditional urban structures by superimposing new
radial street patterns, forcing the indigenous populations to move to the periphery of the new urban
area. The new urban areas were designed for a small, non-indigenous elite that needed electricity,
roads, water, sanitation, and drainage to carry out their extractive practices. This practice of spatial
segregation is especially evident in the Portuguese crown's early Brazilian and African coastal
settlements (Godfrey, 1991; Pereira, 1992). The periphery, where the indigenous were forced to
reside, never benefited from the same amenities as the colonial area and remained in a rudimentary
state (Elate, 2004). This colonial legacy persists in newly independent states today as their modern
cities grapple with a large indigenous population without access to basic services such as water, "The
infrastructure crisis now facing fast growing cities is a testament not simply to the technical and fiscal
challenge.. .but the legacy of an incomplete modernity which rested on a brutal distinction between
'citizens' who could lay claim to potable water and mere 'subjects' who were left to make do as best
they could" (Mamdani, 1996).
Newly independent states lack the financial and human resources to extend colonial
infrastructure networks to all urban residents. When ex-colonies gained their independence many
Europeans that possessed the colony's major sources of capital and technical knowledge fled
(Ezyaguirre, 1989). These largely low-income countries, which were struggling to create new public
institutions and functioning markets, had difficulties managing existing networks and attracting new
private investment to infrastructure sectors. Furthermore, rural residents who were either forbidden
to enter urban centers or rendered to low-skilled manual labor under the colonial regime began to
migrate to cities post-independence in search of better economic opportunities. In some countries
conflicts raged in rural areas and citizens would escape en masse to the cities, which often
experienced less violence or offered more protection. This rural-urban migration greatly exacerbated
the financial and human resource constraints; service coverage could not keep pace with city growth
(Cross, 2001). The result is increasingly precarious living conditions for millions of urban residents in
developing countries world-wide.
Despite these extraordinary stresses on newly independent countries, governments and
donors envisioned a universal level of safe, reliable, and piped water provision that mimicked the
kind of 'first class' infrastructure found in former colonial powers. This vision was part of newly
independents states' nation building processes. However, these countries' limited economic bases
prevented realization of their plans. The 15-20 year plans proved over-ambitious in scope and too
determined to retain European standards in levels of coverage, technologies, and service. Financial
resources and fiscal policies could not match these standards and a 'downward spiral' in water and
sanitation (W&S) infrastructure ensued. As alternative models presented themselves, such as the
"appropriate technology" movements in rural areas, countries' leaders were too invested in the idea of
infrastructure development as metaphor for nation building to consider prudent alternatives
(Mkandawire, 2000).
The vision of universal, safe, and reliable service has not been realized in many developing
world cities. Close to 1.1 billion people do not have access to safe drinking water - that is more than
1 out of every 6 people on earth. Of these 1.1 billion, 173 million are urban residents. The situation
is particularly acute in Africa, which has the lowest coverage rate of any world region at 62 percent;
Asia is a distant second at 81 percent. Three hundred million Africans were without safe drinking
water in 2000, 44 million of them live in cities (JMP, 2000). The reasons for this large coverage gap
include insufficient financial and human resources in the W&S sector, dysfunctional incentive
structures for providers, and planning constraints in informal settlements.
1.2 PLANNING CONSTRAINTS
Water and Sanitation receive much less financial support from governments, donors, lenders,
and the private sector than other infrastructure sectors. Developing country officials, often at the
behest of donors and lenders, tend to concentrate on sectors that create more immediate and
measurable economic growth. Sectors like information technology and communications and
transport can deliver rapid results on key economic indicators such as export levels. Lenders prefer
transport and telecom to water and sanitation because these projects' loans generate greater returns.
The rate of return on World Bank loans for highway and water supply projects between 1983 and
1992 was 29 percent and 6 percent, respectively (Davis, 2005); Donors prefer these more lucrative
sectors for similar reasons - they must demonstrate high project returns to taxpayers, managing
boards, or individual contributors. During the 1990s transport received US$55 billion dollars and
energy received US$45 billion in overseas development assistance while W&S received only $25
billion (World Bank 2001; OECD, 2001).
Politicians often maintain water tariffs that are too low for operations' cost recovery let alone
generating a surplus for new investments. These tariffs do not reflect the increasing difficulty of
maintaining ageing assets, discovering new sources of water, and delivering it over longer distances to
a growing population. Elected officials, who view water as a social good that should be provided to
customers at low prices, pressure utilities to keep tariffs lower than what residents are willing to pay
for improved services (Boland, 2000). If costs are not recovered, existing infrastructure maintained,
and new infrastructure built, the goals of a universal level of safe, reliable water will be difficult to
achieve.
Governments also give preference to new infrastructure investment over the existing system's
operation and maintenance. This was part of the "networked city" goal that infused post-
independence technocratic planning; extending the network symbolized progress and was more
rapidly achievable than changes in institutions or human resources (Grey, 2006). This was
compounded by retaining 'first world' technical standards when investing in new assets. Costly,
inappropriate technologies were an inefficient use of limited resources. Although constructing new
infrastructure is necessary to achieving sector goals, doing so at the cost of maintaining existing
infrastructure is not conducive to the long-term financial sustainability of the system (World Bank,
2006).
Inefficient public utilities present a barrier to achieving coverage and service goals. Non-
revenue water, the difference between sourced water and water paid for by customers, can reach up
to 50 percent among developing country utilities (Davis, 2005). This means that revenue is only
received for one out of every two cubic meters of water produced. Neglected networks literally leak
profits into the ground and inefficient billing and failure to prevent clandestine connections create a
gap between the level of delivered and billed water. Low collection rates are also problematic. The
capacity to enforce payment is low and non-paying customers are often politically protected from
disconnection policies. Non-revenue water and low collection rates make full cost recovery difficult
to achieve. Overstaffing also contributes to inefficient operations. Utilities' attempts to achieve
'social goals' like employment generation create bloated workforces that drive up operating costs and
result in reduced profits (Davis, 2006).
Utilities have failed to serve a substantial number of households in their service areas,
particularly low-income or marginalized populations. This is a result of both financial disincentives
and political pressure. Low-income or marginalized populations often live in informal settlements,
commonly referred to as 'slums', 'shanty towns', or peri-urban areas, without legal tenure to their
land. Politicians often prohibit utilities from connecting these 'squatters' for fear of legitimizing their
claim or cementing their presence. When permitted to serve these residents, utilities often fail to do
so because they find these areas financially unattractive. They presume residents are too poor to pay
for services, will make illegal connections, or will tamper with meters and drive costs up without
significantly contributing to revenues (Cross, 2005).
1.3 LARGE PRIVATE-SECTOR PARTICIPATION AS THE SOLUTION
For the last twenty years governments and donors have turned to private-sector participation
(PSP) as a way to tackle many of these challenges. By the end of 1997 private companies operating in
developing countries had already reached financial closure on US$23 billion (in 1997 values) of
investment in water and sewerage projects. In total, 97 projects had been implemented in 35
developing countries, ranging from management contracts to leases, concessions, divestitures, and
build-operate-own or build-operate-transfer arrangements1 (Silva, 1998).
Private-sector participation in state run industries has often found merit on ideological
grounds. Margaret Thatcher's administration adopted the ideas of free market economists that
blamed Britain's post-war nationalization for a sluggish economy, escalating public debt, and rising
1 Management or lease agreements, typically 10 to 15 years in length, involve the private sector taking on full
commercial risk and responsibility for operation and management of state owned infrastructure, billing, and
collections with no responsibility for major capital investments. In concessions, on the other hand, the private
operator adopts full commercial risk involved with a management or lease plus major capital investments in
infrastructure. Concessions typically last 20 or 30 years to allow the concessionaire to recuperate investment costs.
Build-operate agreements usually occur for single assets (i.e. wastewater treatment facilities) where the private
investor will build or rehabilitate state-owned infrastructure. The government then has the option of keeping the
asset, leasing it to the private operator, or selling it to the private operator. A divestiture is the most extreme form of
privatization and involves the sale or transfer of state assets to a private company.
unemployment; these same economists encouraged PSP in government industry and reduced
government spending as a promising alternative (Yergin, 2002). During Thatcher's two terms, 1979 -
1987, close to 5 billion pounds sterling (in 1984 values) was sold off to private actors. The
privatization campaign culminated in the government's privatization of England and Wales' ten
water and sewerage authorities in 1989 (Bakker, 2003). International development agencies such as
the World Bank, and its private sector arm, the International Finance Corporation, acting in part on
the Washington Consensus 2, heavily promoted the privatization wave that expanded to the
developing world in the following decade (Davis, 2005).
Enormous capital investment needs have driven privatization in developing countries.
Neither public utilities nor sub-national governments have access to the amount of financing
necessary to support these large capital investments (Davis, 2005). This is especially true for Sub-
Saharan African (SSA) countries that have some of the world's lowest incomes. In a World Bank
ranking of countries' gross national income per capita, 22 out of the 25 lowest ranked countries are
located in Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2004). Capital is needed to reach the 1.1 billion people
without safe water access and reduce environmental damage to overused water sources. Network
extensions can help bring piped water to currently un-served communities while development of
new raw water sources can reduce water drawing from polluted or overburdened sources (Davis,
2005).
For the majority, PSP means a single, large private-sector operator. Because investment in
the water sector is considered to be "lumpy", or large relative to the size of the market, and long-
term, often requiring several decades for cost-recovery, a single provider model is considered most
efficient. This rationale is borne out in policy advice to developing country governments who are
encouraged to develop a 'networked' city, usually achieved through 'natural monopoly'. It is feared
that having multiple providers could result in wasteful duplication of infrastructure or poor
coordination of investments and operations. A single provider is also thought to make regulation,
uniform water quality, and private investment easier (Ehrhardt, 1999; Solo 1998). Research has
helped bolster this advice. An analysis using the elasticity of supply with respect to production costs
2 The Washington Consensus was formulated between 15th Street and 19th Street in Washington among members of
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the U.S. Treasury Department, and the World Bank. It argued that the keys
to success in developing countries were three things: macro-stability, liberalization (lowering tariff barriers and
market deregulation) and privatization (Stiglitz, 2000).
in Seoul's metropolitan water supply found that if the Seoul metropolitan region's urban water
markets were consolidated into a single water service market, production costs would be reduced by
up to 47 percent (Lee, 1998). An econometric analysis of utility benchmarking data such as annual
operating costs, number of customers served, volume of water produced, and distribution network
length for 270 utilities - 83 in Africa - demonstrated that utilities could reduce unit operating costs
by increasing the size of their operation or consolidating several operators. An African utility that
doubles the size of the population it serves would increase its cost by only 61 percent (Tynan, 2005).
Despite the rationale for economies of scale and supporting evidence, PSP within the single
provider model has had decidedly mixed results with respect to the sector's goals of universal
coverage, adequate service, and financial and environmental sustainability. Capital investment and
increased access to the poor who regularly lack access to the piped network are both important
variables to consider when measuring coverage. Data on investment by W&S utilities before and
after PSP ventures in several countries suggest that involvement of the private sector does accelerate
capital investment, but capital improvements often fall short of contractual targets established
between the firm and government. For example, investments during the first year of a 1994
concession in Cancun, Mexico fell short by more than half: the private concessionaire invested US$56
million when the contract required the company to invest US$120 million. The company's contract
also stipulated that it would extend water supply services from 60% to 95% of the city's urban zone
by 1996; actual coverage rates in that year were closer to 87% (Merino-Jarez, 2000).
A critical factor in increasing coverage to poor households is an affordable connection fee.
Contract bidding for PSP is often designed to obtain the lowest volumetric tariff bidder. This often
results in private operators charging high connection prices to increase revenues, often excluding the
city's poor residents. Alternative bidding schemes that emphasize increased coverage, like the one in
La Paz, Bolivia have shown more promise in reaching poor households (Komives, 2000).
Nevertheless, privatization's emphasis on the pursuit of profits (Yarrow, 1986) creates an incentive
structure that makes increasing coverage to the poorest of the poor an unattractive venture.
Efficiency gains are often touted as PSP's greatest benefit. Many consider that private
management's responsiveness to shareholder goals results in an efficiency advantage for private firms
in most circumstances (Yeaple, 1995). Greater efficiency in the W&S sector includes efficiency of
investment, usually improved through lower non-revenue water rates, and efficiency of operations
and maintenance, usually improved by lowering the unit cost of water across various inputs. Studies
find that efficiency with PSP is mixed. A study in the Asia and Pacific region that compared 22
private and 28 public utilities found no significant effects of PSP on efficiency. A study by the same
author found that among 21 utilities studied in Africa, the 2 privately owned ones showed greater
signs of efficiency (Estache, 2002). These and other studies conclude that market structure is the
largest efficiency determinant. Contracts that reward cost-cutting measures, through predictable but
unpopular means such as staff retrenchment or elimination of illegal connections owned by the poor,
often witness the greatest efficiency gains.
One of the most hotly debated aspects of PSP is potential tariff increases. Because the private
sector is usually brought in to increase investments and break what has been termed a "low-level
equilibrium" - poorly maintained systems with insufficient revenues that fail to meet desired service
levels (Singh, 1993) - monthly service fees and connection charges are likely to rise. Much of the
literature corroborates this presentiment, including documented tariff increases in Guinea, Bolivia,
and Argentina (Clark, 2002; Clarke, 2004). These increases can be partially offset by cost saving
measures such as staff retrenchment. Regardless, when the private sector is brought in to spur
infrastructure investment, there will be pressures to meet tax and fee obligations and return profits to
shareholders (Davis, 2005).
Private-sector participation's record on environmental performance is difficult to ascertain
due to a dearth of empirical work on the subject. Case studies that do exist paint a varied picture.
Private utilities in England and Wales reduced pollution by having to adhere to stringent European
Union pollution abatement standards while others in New Orleans, Jakarta, and Manila committed
serious pollution infringements (Davis, 2005). One hypothesized post-privatization effect is increased
scrutiny from civil society, regulators, and watchdog groups when a privatized utility takes over
operations (Brubaker, 2002), but more empirical evidence is needed to conclude if this increased
scrutiny results in better sector performance.
Private sector participation contract structures are designed to achieve financial
sustainability. Elected officials' decisions are often dictated by the election cycle. This political
incentive combined with politicians' close relationships with W&S utilities sometimes lead to short
planning horizons that inhibit proper water asset and resources management. In contrast, the private
sector, with its long-term lease and concession contracts, usually 15 and 30 years, respectively, has
incentives to manage infrastructure for longer time horizons to recover capital investments and
derive profits. This is thought to achieve water systems' financial sustainability. Actual
sustainability, however, is highly dependent on the specific incentives the private operator faces
(Davis, 2005).
The private sector's failure to achieve the coverage, service, and sustainability goals planners
envisioned has critics calling it a 'broken promise'. A backlash has recently emerged with activists
arguing that water privatization is akin to 'theft' and 'a human rights violation'. The noted academic
and environmental activist Vandana Shiva, in a piece titled, Captive Water: Privatizing water will
lead to war, calls the right to water a birthright and water's privatization as 'the ultimate human
rights violation, the ultimate human wrong' (Shiva, 2003). This backlash, accompanied by evidence
that PSP has failed to successfully reach many who lack access to safe water, culminated in a
consensus for 'a return to the public' at the fourth World Water Forum in Mexico City in March,
2006. A United Nations' appointed advisory panel began its recommendations with a call to
strengthen local public utilities and the director of the World Bank's Water and Energy Department
stated that 15 years of development efforts were wasted because multilateral agencies imposed
privatization (Malkin, 2006; PSI, 2006).
The issue of public or private water provision is a deceptive dichotomy. Both the public and
private sectors have served an important role in water provision throughout history, often trading
places multiple times. Nowhere is this more evident than in a country with one of the highest
connection rates in the world - Great Britain. The oldest sections of Britain's modern network were
built by the private sector in the 1600s in a competitive, unregulated market. As the years passed
municipalities increasingly regarded water provision as a normal commercial venture and by 1851
private water companies supplied 60 percent of Britain's urban population with piped water supply
(Bakker, 2003). Industrialization, contestation over water resources, the cholera and typhoid
epidemics in the mid-1800s, falling revenues, and the need for large capital investments3 led first to
regulation and later to full municipalization of certain systems. The water sector came to be
characterized by local, public water providers and heavily regulated, private water companies.
3 Interestingly, during 1800s Britain modest profits in the water sector prevented private companies from making
infrastructure investments necessary for expansion. The government used its borrowing powers under the
parliamentary act to expand networks (Millward, 2005).
Continued conflicts over supply and incidences of pollution led to system nationalization in 1974,
only to be followed by a renewed enthusiasm for free markets and reduced government spending that
resulted in the world's largest water assets' divestiture in 1989 (Bakker, 2003; Millward, 2005).
Britain's experience shows that an analysis of the competitive, regulatory, environmental, and public
health scenario is necessary before advocating for a particular ownership model.
1.4 SMALL PRIVATE-SECTOR PROVIDERS
Modest investment in large scale PSP, coupled with limited government infrastructure
budgets, has led to a different type of PSP in W&S that has attracted substantially less attention in the
literature despite the fact that it serves as many, or more, people as compared to the large, single
private providers. Low-income countries suffer from low revenues and competing priorities that
often leave W&S infrastructure neglected. In addition, although large-scale PSP in infrastructure was
a notable US$ 496 billion in developing countries between 1990 and 1998, only 5 percent of that (US$
23 billion) went to W&S projects (Roger, 1999). Today, small private-sector providers (SPSPs) of
W&S services are playing an increasingly important role in urban water provision.
SPSPs are assumed to serve fewer than 50,000 people or 5000 customers, employ fewer than
50 employees, and supply small settlements, either within large cities, small-towns, peri-urban areas,
or rural areas (Kariuki, 2005; Vezina, 2002). They operate informally, and sometimes illegally,
requiring them to self-finance their infrastructure and rely largely on revenues to cover their costs.
They either develop their own water source or draw water from the utility's network. SPSPs take
three main forms: mobile vendors who use vehicles or manual labor, point source operators who use
standpipes or kiosks, and small network operators who use piped distribution and storage tanks
(Kariuki, 2005). SPSPs are estimated to be the principal water providers for 25 percent of city
residents in Latin American (Solo, 1999), between 20 and 45 percent in Southeast Asia (Vezina,
2003), and an average of 50 percent, but as high as 80 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa (Collignon,
2000)4.
4 Sub-Saharan Africa had the hardest time attracting large PSP investment among world regions - only 2 percent of
all private infrastructure investment (US$ 10 billion) between 1990 and 1998 occurred there (Roger, 1999). By
contrast, over 75 percent of investment went to Latin America and the Caribbean and East Asia and the Pacific where
relatively higher household incomes, political stability, and government commitment to market liberalization
allowed for greater returns on investment. Perceptions of investment climate drive this disparity. According to the
Despite the substantial role SPSPs play in the W&S sector, policy makers have paid
comparatively less attention to them, focusing more with urban network expansion through a large
utility. This is partially the result of assumptions surrounding SPSP operations. SPSPs are often
viewed as "temporary" - although many have been in operation for over twenty years, "rent-seekers"
- that take advantage of unreliable public services so as to gouge their customers, and "poor quality" -
providing a service that does not meet technical and water quality standards (Kariuki, 2005). Because
so little is known about SPSPs' cost and price structures, investment profiles, and operational features,
it is unclear whether they suffer from the same shortcomings as large concessionaires and lessees of
municipal W&S networks, and under what circumstances, if any, they can be viewed as an integral
part of a W&S service delivery strategy. This study seeks to contribute to the dearth of knowledge
surrounding SPSP operations in the water sector and also to explore the extent to which they
contribute or impede progress towards the goal of providing affordable, safe, reliable, and financially
and environmentally sustainable water services for households in developing world cities.
institutional investor index, SSA is the riskiest investment region in the world. It cites lack of government
commitment, weak domestic entrepreneurship and financial institutions, and unclear regulatory and legal
frameworks as some of the myriad reasons private investors considering SSA should proceed with caution
(Donaldson, 1997). It is less surprising then that SPSP activity is higher in Africa than other world regions. Another
reason is the high incidence of failed or post-conflict states in Africa - a literature review found that SPSPs are
especially prevalent in these situations (Kariuki, 2005).
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CHAPTER 2:
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 OVERVIEW
Academic work on Small Private-Sector Providers (SPSP) is very limited. Although a handful
of academics did begin looking at private infrastructure services that serve the poor in the 1970s,
intellectual work specifically focusing on SPSPs has not culminated in a comprehensive body of
knowledge.
Project and policy reports documenting SPSPs' scope, scale, and operating environment are
much more prevalent. The World Bank's Water and Energy Department and Water & Sanitation
Program are the primary publishers but other bilateral and multilateral agencies have also
contributed. These reports are both in response to exponential SPSP growth in the last decade and
policy makers' increased awareness of SPSPs potential advantages. Receiving relatively less attention
than networked utilities, policy makers considered SPSPs to be temporary, inefficient, rent-seeking,
and unconcerned with quality. However, in the last 5 to 7 years realities surrounding utility coverage
failures, rapid urbanization, and pressures to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDG)5 have
forced policy makers to take notice of SPSPs and consider capitalizing on their existing services to
achieve sector goals. Although these reports stop short of detailing SPSPs' cost structure, prices, and
financing sources, they do provide general business profiles, insight into their operating environment,
and a good basis for future research.
Small private-sector providers are most prevalent in countries with low W&S coverage levels,
ineffective utilities that provide inadequate or partial services, and remote or difficult to access
regions. A World Bank literature review found SPSP operations in 49 countries; the actual number
may be much higher since many SPSP operations go undocumented. SPSPs are especially prevalent
in post-conflict countries and others with weak or failed states - of the 49 documented countries with
SPSP operations, 22 were in Africa, the highest incidence of SPSP activity of any continent. SPSPs
have traditionally played three roles: "gap filler" in countries where utilities have high coverage
levels but low service quality; 'independent network operator', developing and operating systems in
areas where there is no public service but demand exists; and 'sub-concessionaire', buying utility
water in bulk and selling it on to the customers (Kariuki, 2005).
s The Millennium Development Goals are eight goals that all 191 United Nations member states have agreed to
achieve by 2015. One key facet of the goal 'Ensure environmental sustainability' is to 'Reduce by half the number of
people without sustainable access to safe drinking water'.
SPSPs have been in operation for more than 20 years but have seen tremendous growth in the
last decade. Most are established for the express purpose of delivering water. The majority are for-
profit entities responding to consumer demand, although non-profit SPSPs are sometimes established
to respond to crises. SPSPs are especially prevalent in peri-urban areas and small towns with
populations of 5,000 to 20,000 inhabitants. Critics of water commercialization might question why
community managed systems, which have demonstrated success in villages, are not being
implemented in these areas. Peri-urban areas and small towns are generally too populated and the
sense of community too diminished for community management to work effectively. At the same
time they are still too small and costly to attract the interest of large private companies (Vezina,
2002).
SPSPs include vendors who use carts, bicycles, or poles to carry containers of water to
customers; kiosk or standpipe operators; tanker truck delivery persons; independent network
operators that bring water directly to private connections; and households that sell water from their
private connections to neighbors. They either use their own independent water source such as
groundwater from a borewell or surface water from a natural source, or a dependent source such as
bulk water from a utility network (Davis, 2005). In general, SPSPs can be classified into 6 typologies:
Table 2.1: Typology of SPSPs in water supply
Independent Dependent
Network Type I: Uses own water Type IL Purchases water
source and sells via mini- from utility and sells via
operator grid mini-grid
Type III: Uses own water Type IV: Purchases waterStationary source and sells at fixed from utility and sells at
prvier location fixed location
Mobile Type V: Uses own water Type VI: Purchases 
water
distributor source and delivers to from utility, 
delivers to
customers customers
Sou re: Afdapted from Karuki and Sch warz (2005)
SPSPs are inherently different from large providers mainly because of their: 1) size; 2) sources
of financing; 3) operating environment; and 4) prices. They distinguish themselves from large
providers through a variety of factors such as areas and populations served, service levels, technology
employed, and cost recovery methods.
SPSPs finance their investments mostly through their own earnings or savings, but also use
loans or donations from family and friends or money borrowed from informal lenders. Access to
formal credit, such as bank loans, is rare and a major business constraint. In comparison, public
utilities are often financed through taxes or overseas development assistance (ODA) in the form of
loans or grants. Concessionaires self-finance new investments but are often aided by government
subsidies or ODA, as was the experience in Conakry, Guinea (Clarke, 2002).
SPSPs operate in an informal economy, sometimes illegally in the shadow of a "legal
monopoly". While governments provide financial, regulatory, and administrative support to utilities,
SPSPs receive no such benefits. Unlike utilities they are not eligible for subsidies or public works'
contracts, fall outside the scope of regulatory policies, and have little or no access to government
institutions (Collignon, 2000). Their illegal status leaves them open to sudden dispossession or
closure, often compelling them to recover investment costs rapidly through relatively higher prices.
Without an official contract, SPSPs are most susceptible to changes in the macro-economy, especially
with respect to inflation on input prices. They also serve the populations utilities consider too costly
to serve: populations on the city's margin or on hillsides obtain most of their water from SPSPs
(Kariuki, 2005).
SPSPs have been documented as charging as much as twelve times more than what utilities
charge for the same quantity of water, but this is highly dependent on SPSP type. Mobile distributors
such as manual carters and tanker trucks charge the most while kiosk and standpipe operators and
small independent network operators (ISNOs) charge much less. For example, on average, ISNOs
only charge 1.5 times what utilities charge. SPSPs often charge more than utilities because of the
higher costs associated with their operations. In theory and practice, we know that utilities enjoy
economies of scale that SPSPs cannot capture. Thus, we expect some increase in price among SPSPs.
However, sector planners are still uncertain whether economies of scale fully explain the often
considerable price differences seen around the developing world. Some studies have found clear
examples of SPSPs earning exorbitant profits (Lovei, 1993); others have found that SPSPs earn
roughly the equivalent of unskilled labor (Whittington, 1999). In general, however, very little is
known about SPSPs' cost structure that allows for reliable estimates of profit margins and
identification of cost components that could be favorably affected by strategic policy and business
support interventions. This study seeks to provide such an analysis in the case of Maputo,
Mozambique.
2.2 OPERATING ENVIRONMENT
Some of the growth and entry constraints in the informal economy include (1) lack of credit
for capital expansion; (2) lack of transparent money handling procedures; (3) delinquent customers;
(4) robbery and "pirate" connections; and (5) exclusion from government subsidies (Snell, 1998).
SPSPs that operate in a risky environment will concentrate on recovering initial investment costs as
quickly as possible, usually through high connection fees, which serves as an access barrier to poor
households. Also, they may not optimize coverage because the threat of closure influences their
decision to expand. Although the literature describes these different influences it does not assign
them weights.
Macro conditions include the home country's economic performance and institutional
capacity. For example, if inflation is high then input prices will go up, directly affecting costs and
consumer prices; because SPSPs are small they are less able to internalize these costs than a large
utility would. An analysis of African utilities discovered that institutions and governance issues such
as corruption were central to inefficiencies (Estache, 2002). It is possible that the same institutional
weaknesses that affect water utilities could affect SPSPs. Location affects SSPS prices because, for
example, the further truckers and carters have to travel to obtain water the more costly their fuel or
labor costs become. Physical terrain is a factor, especially for ISNOs (Types I & II), because the more
difficult it is to dig a borehole or lay pipes, such as in hilly areas, the more expensive it becomes to
deliver water or expand coverage (Kariuki, 2005).
2.3 FINANCING AND CREDIT
There are myriad financing and credit instruments in the developing world. Institutions
offering these instruments range from the formal, such as private banks, to the informal, such as
revolving credit groups. Some of the instruments available to borrowers are private bank loans,
credit union or cooperative loans, microfinance or micro-credit loans, government agency loans,
revolving credit or community loans, and loans from informal money lenders. Many entrepreneurs
also borrow from family or friends.
The instrument's requirement is highly dependent on the lender. Interest rates are
significantly lower for formal institution loans such as private banks and micro-lending institutions
(MLI) than informal money lenders; informal money lenders charge effective interest rates as high as
78 percent (Banerjee, 2004). Repayment periods also vary with micro-lending institutions requiring
payments rapidly after fund disbursal, in some cases after two weeks, and banks usually requiring the
first payment after one month (Morduch, 1999).
Entrepreneurs in the informal economy have been largely bypassed by formal financial
institutions. Informality has been associated with greater risk and lenders are risk averse - they go
bankrupt if they cannot recuperate their loans. Therefore, banks in both developed and developing
economies have largely served entrepreneurs and individuals in the formal economy where
asymmetries of information are lower, contracting is backed by the rule of law, collateral more easily
guaranteed, incomes are higher, and perhaps most importantly, enforcement costs are lower
(Banerjee, 2004; Morduch, 1999). As a result, informal entrepreneurs, who we now know have a
capacity to make productive use of their loans and repay them on schedule, were left with little
recourse except funds from family and friends, and where none existed, informal money lenders.
Micro-lending institutions and their variants, such as revolving credit loans, existed since the 1950s
but really began to fill the formal credit gap left by banks in earnest during the 1970s (Morduch,
1999).
Empirical evidence on micro-lending has indicated that both the borrower and lending
institution benefit from greater borrower wealth. Average loan balance for a borrower from a
financially self-sufficient program was $430 (Morduch, 1999). In low-income countries, borrowers at
that level tend to be among the "better off' poor or are even slightly above the poverty line. Micro-
loans are less costly and more easily administered to the "better-off' poor. There is an inverse
relationship between a borrower's income and the loan's poverty reducing impact. Expanding
financial services in this way can foster economic efficiency and perhaps economic growth but it will
do little directly to affect the vast majority of poor households (Morduch, 1999).
An empirical study of thirteen MLIs in seven countries discovered that the poor are probably
more risk-averse. Very poor borrowers, given the choice, tend to take out small, subsistence
protecting loans. These are seldom invested in new technology, fixed capital, or even hiring of labor;
the willingness to take risks and to invest in new technology increases with income. Loans to higher
income groups are more often used for promotional activities such as the purchase of fixed capital and
the hiring of labor from outside the borrower family. In addition, higher income households can
commonly access larger loans because of their greater savings capacity and their ability to offer
collateral and this widens the choice of investment opportunities to include "lumpy" investments.
Some very poor households, against the general pattern, achieved substantial increases in income
from their loans. These outliers fell into a rather specialized category of investors in capital entailing
a low increase in risk, for example, minor irrigation (Malawi), high yielding seeds in rain sufficient
areas (Indonesia) and replacement of existing handicrafts-making equipment (Bolivia) (Mosley, 1998).
African MLIs lag behind those in Asia and Latin America with respect to market size and
penetration, outreach, financial performance, and product diversification. One of Africa's most
successful micro-lenders reaches only 14,000 households and Mozambique's only lender reaches
4000, while lenders in Asia and Latin America reach well over 100,000 households (Mehta, 2003).
Although there are over 1000 MLIs in Africa, only about 20 are on their way towards sustainability.
Most African MLIs have negative profit margins and perform worse than their Asian and Latin
American counterparts on operational sustainability and portfolio quality. In general the majority of
African MLIs offer only one product: loans for income-generating activities (Mehta, 2003). African
MLIs' poorer performance is largely a result of their environment. African countries are very low
income and households have very little demand for these loans because markets do not exist for their
products. Micro-lenders must also be more selective since extensive lending to low-income
households could result in major defaults and eventual bankruptcy.
SPSPs would mainly use loans for capital investments either for start-up or expansion. Some
might also use them to 'stay afloat' when revenues fall below operating costs. Lack of access to credit
is often a major constraint to service expansion or new entry. SPSPs will likely make productive use
of their loans since they are considered to be the 'better-off poor. Micro-credit can reduce their cost
burden, potentially lowering customers' prices, eventually benefiting the 'worse-off poor that MLIs
still struggle to reach and impact.
2.4 ECONOMIES OF SCALE AND PRICES
SPSPs have long been criticized for their small, inefficient operations that are unable to
achieve adequate economies of scale (EOS). Economies of scale are defined as a decrease in the unit
cost of water as water production increases. It is considered important because cost reductions
through scale economies can be passed onto customers in the form of lower prices. There are at least
two types of scale economies: EOS in capital equipment and EOS in business operations (Winston,
2004). Because the water sector is characterized by costly up-front investments, there is widespread
agreement that a "natural monopoly" model is the most appropriate one for urban water provision
and achieving economies of scale in capital equipment. Proponents argue that this model will
achieve the greatest cost savings from economies of scale by externalizing the single provider's capital
risk, thereby allowing it to recuperate water source, treatment, and network investments in a non-
competitive environment. They are less clear how a "natural monopoly" model can increase EOS in
business operations, believing instead on private sector management models to increase operating
efficiency.
An analysis of 270 utilities by the World Bank found that the evidence for scale economies is
most consistent when volume of water produced is used as the measure of size (other indicators
included number of customers served and network size). However, optimal utility size is also
sensitive to customer characteristics in terms of settlement patterns and density. Results also varied
by region with Africa and South East Asia showing significant returns to scale and Peru showing
constant or even declining returns to scale. Small utilities - 125,000 or fewer customers served -
have the most to gain from expansion (Tynan, 2005).
Although size is a significant cost determinant it is not the only one. The cost of raw water
supply, spatial distribution of customers, efficiency of inputs, and operating environment, among
other factors, all affect unit cost. To better understand how small water systems fared along both
scale and the other various factors, Resources for the Future conducted an analysis on United States'
community water supply data from 1995 and 2000. Although the regulatory and institutional
frameworks in the US are very different from those in developing countries, especially Sub-Saharan
Africa, the economics of water supply are largely the same. The results of the study apply most
directly to ISNOs - Types I & II from the table above. The researchers analyzed between 132 and
1900 water systems in both years depending on the analysis model; the majority of systems use
groundwater. They found that, in general, costs do decline as system size increases. However, they
found very little difference between the median cost of very small systems - 25 to 500 customers -
and small systems - 5001 to 3300 customers. A disaggregated analysis showed that the greatest
economies of scale exist in capital costs, outside costs (analytical lab services and other contract
services), other costs (general and administrative expenses, payments in lieu of taxes and other cash
transfers out), and materials costs, while labor costs and energy costs exhibit the fewest economies of
scale of the six factors. This suggests that larger systems may be relatively better than smaller systems
at bargaining and receiving outside services and materials for a lower cost (Winston, 2004). This
claim is corroborated by a small rural water systems' study in Virginia, United States. The author
found that if the small systems were to organize under a shared cooperative or association they could
purchase goods, such as water treatment chemicals, and technical services, such as repairs, in bulk,
thereby reducing the unit cost of these inputs across small providers (Young, 2002).
Studies analyzing SPSPs' scale economies in developing countries have not do date been done
in a systematic or rigorous way. What we do know is that ISNOs and kiosk / standpipe operators
demonstrate lower unit costs than tanker trucks or mobile vendors using carts, bicycles, or poles. The
cost of a truck is significant and the labor involved in delivering jerricans manually is very costly.
There is also the issue of capacity. A truck can only hold so much water and a human can only cart
or carry so much water. The greatest opportunity for scale economies rests with ISNOs or kiosk /
standpipe operators. Their infrastructure allows for increased water production and delivery with a
smaller burden on inputs.
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CHAPTER 3:
STUDY SITE AND METHODOLOGY: MAPUTO, MOZAMBIQUE
3.1 MOZAMBIQUE
Mozambique began to form settlements as early as the 10th century. Bantu speaking people
had already established kingdoms along the Southern African coast when the Arabs arrived in 900
A.D. The Arabs set up trading posts along the coast as part of their Indian Ocean network that
included the Middle East, India, and other parts of Africa. These posts soon became thriving
settlements as the Bantu kingdoms and Arab traders came together in commerce. Vasco Da Gama
arrived in 1498 and established Portugal's presence at Ilha de Mogambique, the country's first urban
center and colonial capital (Pereira, 1993).
Mozambique endured nearly five centuries as a Portuguese colony until independence in
1975. While the Portuguese expanded their rule and influence over Mozambique, power was limited
to individual settlers who were granted extensive autonomy by the Portuguese crown. Portuguese
landowners exercised almost total control over the indigenous people living in their areas, and
conscripted labor to work their plantations; many also built up private armies, creating mini-
fiefdoms. Power was disputed among many of these semi-autonomous land holders and Portuguese
central control of the colony was weak. This institutional arrangement, Portugal's preoccupation
with more lucrative trade with India and the Far East, and concentration on Brazil's colonization, all
contributed to Mozambique's slow development (Saul, 1985).
Britain's interest in colonial Mozambique began as early as the 1800s. The British feared that
a poor and weak Mozambican colony was a liability to their nearby Rhodesian Empire and
threatened to invade the Portuguese if they did not manage the situation better. In fact, the
Portuguese crown had already put the colony into receivership in the 1740s, but it was not until the
dictator Antonio Salazar came to power in Portugal in 1932 did Rhodesia's influence increase.
Foreign investment -particularly British investment - was given priority over the indigenous
population's welfare. A system of forced labor, or "chibalo"was put into place; men over the age of
15 were forced to work on Portuguese or British plantations, often in chains. The Portuguese shifted
most of the country's administration into the hands of large British financed private companies,
which often "borrowed" Mozambican laborers. Accordingly, migration to South African mines
became a significant characteristic in the Mozambican economy. Only the Portuguese settlers
benefited from these extractive policies and the country's economic, social, and physical
infrastructure further deteriorated (Hall, 1997).
A long, fragmented nationalist movement finally culminated with independence in 1975 after
10 years of fighting. The Frente de Libertagrao de Mogambique (Frelimo), established in 1962 and led
by the national hero Eduardo Mondlane, emerged victorious. The Portuguese, upon leaving, did
their best to sabotage the new Mozambican state by destroying property and infrastructure and
removing as many assets from the country as possible. Additionally, the vast majority of skilled
workers such as academics and doctors fled (Jenkins, 2000).
Frelimo adopted a radical social and economic agenda based on Marxist-Socialist principles.
Because the Portuguese left behind a legacy of inequitable land distribution and food insecurity, land
was nationalized and development policies targeted to rural areas after independence. Frelimo's
policies concentrated on food production, literacy, and health. These programs greatly benefited the
country, but as a result little attention was paid to urban infrastructure (Grest, 1995).
Migration to urban areas during and after the civil war put increased pressure on already
underdeveloped urban infrastructure. Resentful and fearful of Frelimo's success, the South African
apartheid regime formed the Movimiento Nacional de Resistencia de Mocambique, or Renamo,
shortly after Mozambique's independence. Renamo, supported largely by South Africa and
Mozambicans who lost land during nationalization, waged a brutal 16-year guerilla style war against
Frelimo using "scorched earth" and massacre tactics in villages. By the time fighting ended in 1992, a
large part of the 4.5 million internally displaced persons settled in southern cities, especially the
capital city of Maputo, which put a great burden on urban infrastructure and service delivery.
Between 1990 and 1995 the urbanization rate reached 9 percent per year and is currently 5 percent
per year. Given that the fertility rate averaged 3 percent during the last 15 years, inward migration
accounted considerably to urban growth rates (Jenkins, 2000; INS 2004). Although the majority of
Mozambicans are still rural, by 2015 urban Mozambicans will outnumber rural Mozambicans with an
estimated urbanization level of 52 percent (UN HABITAT, 2006).
Over 25 years of armed struggle have taken its toll on the Mozambican economy. The nation
is one of the world's poorest with a gross national income per capita of $2506, 20 percent of the
country living on less than a dollar a day, a life expectancy of 41 years, and a majority illiterate
population (World Bank, 2005; INS, 2004). Only 42 percent of the population, well below the Sub-
6 Mozambique had a population of 19.4 million in 2005.
Saharan African average of 58 percent, has access to an improved water source and 25,000 cholera
cases were reported in 2002 (World Bank, 2005; WHO 2004). A 2002 report on the MDGs cited
Mozambique as "unlikely" to reach the Basic Services goal of "Halving the proportion of population
without sustainable access to an improved water source by 2015" (MDG, 2002). Despite healthy gross
domestic product growth in the last 5 years (over 7 percent per year), Mozambique has been largely
dependent on both bilateral donor aid from the United States, Germany, and Japan, and multilateral
donor aid from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) since the late 1980s;
development aid has averaged US $600 million a year through the 1990s (EIU, 2004). This has led to
development scholars' criticisms over the country's recent development priorities and the
disproportionate influence the Bretton Woods institutions have had on government policies (Jenkins,
1999).
Mozambique joined the privatization movement that swept the developing world in the
1990s. The Bretton Woods institutions began structural adjustment in Mozambique during the civil
war in the mid-1980s; privatization began in earnest in 1989. Between 1985 and 1997 approximately
US $685 million had been lent to Mozambique in structural adjustment aid and the International
Finance Corporation, which tries to promote economic growth in developing countries by financing
private sector investments, had a portfolio of US $146 million in Mozambique by 1999. Of the US
$1.25 billion Mozambique has borrowed from the World Bank in investment loans, US $783 million
is still outstanding (Coates, 2000).
One aim of the World Bank's loans was to facilitate institutional restructuring and private
sector participation (PSP) in the water sector. Fourteen percent, or US $111 million, of the US $783
million in outstanding debt is for a national water project that includes new regulatory and
investment institutions and a management lease contract for five major Mozambican cities. The
loan's goal, in the World Bank's words is: "To improve the quality, reliability and sustainability of
water services for the cities of Maputo, Beira, Quelimane, Nampula, and Pemba, through promoting
greater private sector participation in the provision of these services" (World Bank 2003). The
project is still ongoing in all five cities.
3.2 MAPUTO
Modem day Maputo' was established as Lourengo Marques, the name of a Portuguese
navigator, in 1781. Lourengo Marques was originally just a port but Lisbon elevated it to town status
in 1876 after trade in gold and diamonds increased its importance. Official statistics put the city's
current population between 1.7 and 1.8 million.
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Figure 3. 1: Maputo and Mozambique in regional context
Source: arth Systems Resource Institute's; Geographic Information Systems
Approximately 9 percent of these residents live in the cement city (AdM, 2006; Jenkins, 2000).
Annual growth rates averaged over 9 percent in the 1990s, largely due to inward migration from the
closure of South African mines to Mozambicans, severe drop in agricultural exports, and the civil war
(Boucher, 1995; Jenkins, 2000). The average household size is 6.3 persons; Maputo has the largest
household size anywhere in the country (INS, 2004). Infrastructure services have not kept pace with
city growth: currently only 37 percent have direct access to utility drinking water, either through
private connections or standpipes (AdM, 2006).
Before independence, Maputo's African population was largely employed in the city as
unskilled labor in transport, domestic services, and South African mines and farms. Of Maputo's
7 In this paper Maputo refers to the metropolitan region made up by Maputo, the capital city, and its urban neighbor
Matola, which are supplied by the same water system and together make up the nation's primary urban area. When
necessary, an explicit distinction will be made.
approximately 660,000 working age residents8 today, at most 83 percent have some labor force
participation. The Port and Rail authority is still the largest formal sector employer and many
residents work in the commercial, financial, and service sectors, including national administration.
The informal sector employed 225,000 people in 1997. The informal economy today mainly consists
of domestic services, street vending, local services provision, and small scale productive activities
(Jenkins, 2000). Household expenses in urban areas equaled $148 per month in 2005 values. Incomes,
on the other hand, only averaged $139 per month - urban households have an average savings rate of
zero percent and must balance income and expenses very carefully (INS, 2004).
Maputo's original spatial distribution of the population was along distinctly racial lines, with
the majority of African residents living outside the planned urban area (Jenkins, 2000). Mozambicans
were forbidden to own land; they had to resort to squatting on unplanned settlements in this
peripheral area. Additionally, during the Frelimo independence movement, the Portuguese used
foreign investment to finance large urban projects in the planned urban area that pushed many
proximate Mozambican families towards the fringe. At independence, most of these 'shantytown'
areas housing African Mozambicans did not have basic water, sanitation, or community services.
President Samora Machel described this situation in a March 1980 speech:
"Lourengo Marques, city of cement, built high to mark the difference between us and
the colonists.... Lourengo Marques city of reeds and tin, relegated to the flood plains,
storehouse of human labor and suffering used to create luxury for the colonists.. .On the one
side; cement, opulence, the brilliantly clean streets, on the other side; the insecurity of social
injustice, the discrimination, the poverty and the gloom of misery" (Pinsky, 1982).
Today Maputo is a still a bifurcated city - a "cement" center with reasonably adequate infrastructure
services where the wealthy live is juxtaposed with the peri-urban9 "fringe" zones which have very
limited infrastructure and house the city's lower-income residents.
Although the city covers a total area of 675 square kilometers, as of 1999, ninety-six percent
of the total urban population occupied only approximately 320 square kilometers (Jenkins, 2000).
8 Working age is 15-64 years of age. This figure may only include residents in Maputo's cement city and immediate
surroundings and major parts of Matola. The actual working age population is likely to be higher than this figure.
9 Maputo's peri-urban areas are typical of Africa in that they exhibit (1) rapid and unplanned growth with negative
impacts on public health and environmental degradation; (2) inadequate infrastructure to meet even basic needs; and
(3) a significant proportion of low-income residents (SEAP, 2004).
The colonial regime defined the administrative structure in the 1960s by breaking the city down into
5 districts, and if adjoining Matola is considered, 8 districts. Districts are unofficially broken down
into neighborhoods, or bairros; Maputo has 108 bairros. Bairros are broken down into block groups,
or quarteirio, but districts are the smallest official administrative unit.
The table below is a network service and density level assessment for the city's principal
areas. In total, Maputo's peri-urban areas, minus the semi-urban area, include over 1.2 million
residents, or two-thirds of Maputo's population. These zones of the city are expected to grow faster
than the city's center. It is estimated that by 2015, peri-urban Maputo will have 1.6 million
inhabitants and the utility will have difficulty keeping up with this growth (Hydroconseil, 2005).
Figure 3.2: Cities ofMaputo and Matola
Source: Hydroconseil Geographic Informiation Systems Files
Table 3.1: Density and in service level in different Maputo and Matola areas
Density, service level Number ofBairros Legend
Cement City dense, good 11 Dark grey
Semi-urban area dense, fair 11 Dark orange
Northern Maputo sparse, poor 56 Beige
Matola proper sparse, good 12 Green
Northern Matola sparse, poor 18 Light green
Utility Network Blue line
3.3 THE WATER SECTOR
The main source for the water supply system for Maputo is the Umbeluzi River. The
Umbeluzi river basin covers a total area of 5,460 km2, of which 41% is located in Mozambique, 58%
in Swaziland, and 1% in the Republic of South Africa. The current water supply system is solely
based on intake from Pequenos Libombos dam along the Umbeluzi River. This source will become
insufficient within 6 to 9 years. However, sufficient additional resources are available from other
nearby rivers, including the Incomati and Sabie Rivers; feasibility studies for dam construction or
augmentation are underway for both sources. An additional challenge to bulk water supply for the
region is treatment capacity at the Umbeluzi Water Treatment Works located in southern Matola.
Work has begun to expand capacity and is slated to be completed by 2009.
Maputo's second major water source is groundwater. Since the current utility network does
not reach all of Maputo's inhabited areas, alternative sources, namely groundwater, have been in use
for decades. Groundwater provides as much, or more, water as the network to peri-urban residents.
Residents either buy water from independent small network operators (ISNO) who all currently
source groundwater, dig personal wells or boreholes, or buy water from neighbors' wells or
boreholes. The upper aquifer - fine sand dunes - has very low productivity and is not suitable for
bulk extraction. By contrast, the deeper aquifer - sandstones and limestone - has a much higher
productivity and is generally suitable for bulk extraction; 60 meters is the recommended minimum
depth for boreholes (Hydroconseil, 2005).
Throughout the 1900s government authorities worldwide provided water to its citizens.
Water's property as a merit good" and ability to produce public health externalities committed public
authorities to provide this most basic of entitlements. Colonial regimes, however, gave service
priority to the elite living in city centers and Portugal's practices in Maputo were no exception.
After Mozambique's independence in 1975, state investment in Maputo's urban infrastructure
nearly halted due to the civil war - during the mid-eighties gross domestic product grew very little
and actually declined between 1982 and 1983, and government consumption grew no more than 10
percent annually (IMF, 2006). Even when the government was spending, it concentrated its
resources on education, health, and rural infrastructure to make up for colonial injustices; a third of
total government spending went to these areas between 1998 and 2000 (Heltberg, 2003). As a result
of Mozambique's economic woes and urban population boom, the public utility's coverage and
service levels suffered dearly. Aguas de Maputo (AdO), the public water utility at the time, lacked
the necessary capital to rehabilitate, upgrade, or expand its infrastructures. There is also evidence of
central government's reluctance to serve peri-urban areas during the 1990s when AdO was still in
operation (Pinsky, 1982).
The current Maputo water coverage situation is disconcerting. Although a slight
improvement from over a decade ago, the government and privately managed water utility are still
falling short of sector goals and are underperforming in absolute terms (DNA, 2004). The network
currently reaches approximately 50 percent of Maputo's residents; 37 percent obtain water from
private connections or standpipes and 13 percent retrieve water from a neighbor's connection to the
network". Although the Cement City accounts for only 9 percent of Maputo's population, it receives
36 percent of the network's private connections. A larger proportion of peri-urban residents rely on
a combination of the network's standpipes and neighbors' connections than direct connections to the
network, 27 and 18 percent, respectively. This negatively affects peri-urban residents' consumption,
water quality, and service levels.
10 A merit good may be defined as a good or service 'whose consumption is believed to confer benefits on society as a
whole greater than those reflected in consumers' own preferences for them' (Black, 1997).
1 Reselling occurs virtually only through utility connections and not SPSP connections because they can monitor
their customers more closely.
Maputo's water consumption levels are not ideal. A person needs between 20 and 50 liters
per capita per day (lpcd) to meet basic needs (WHO, 2004). Most peri-urban Maputo residents use
between 23 and 56 lpcd, with standpipe users consuming significantly less - between 25 and 30 lpcd -
than customers with household or yard connections who consume 57 and 80 lpcd, respectively
(Hydroconseil, 2005). A larger city-wide survey showed similar consumption levels, with households
connected to the utility consuming 73 lpcd on average and standpipe users consuming between 25
and 29 lpcd. Well users consume the least -18 to 24 lpcd (DNA, 2004).
Figure 3.3: Maputo's consumption ranges for various water sources
Source: National Water Directorate and Hydroconseil
But adequate consumption is not the whole story. Water quality also matters. In 2003 a
government sanitation planning report said that Maputo residents suffered 53,740 diarrhea cases that
led to 256 deaths and 1,157 cholera cases that led to 15 deaths; cases and deaths significantly increase
during floods (DNA, 2004). The government also reported that AdM fecal coliform and
microbiological tests were negative and AdM self-reported that 98 percent of its treated water was
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potable (Naienne, 2006). This evidence would indicate that a large number of diarrhea and cholera
cases occur in areas where the network does not exist or, in other words, peri-urban Maputo. The
government did not state the exact bairros where these sicknesses occurred, but a recent survey in 5
peri-urban bairros by Estamos, a local NGO, shows that Costa do Sol had the highest number of
households (43 percent) reporting a member with a stomach related illness in the month previous to
the survey (David, 2006)".
Maputo's environmental health is rapidly deteriorating. There is growing soil salinity in the
coastal plains and river valleys, due mainly to the excessive extraction of subterranean water. The
only existing solid waste landfill in Maputo is unsuitably sited13, virtually unmanaged, and growing
inexorably in size; it has begun to contaminate the subterranean aquifers used for water supply. The
wide use of latrines - and their numbers are rising - has led to nitrate build up in the soil and has also
contaminated shallow wells and the subterranean aquifers (Jenkins, 2000). In fact, water from some
of the utility's boreholes 14 show alarming levels of nitrate concentration and in some cases of
bacteriological contamination such as E coli. A survey taken in 2003 showed that 40 percent of these
boreholes had higher than permissible nitrate and/or E colivalues (Hydroconseil, 2005). The water
sector has to coordinate with the sanitation and solid-waste management sectors to improve water
quality in the Maputo basin if groundwater is to be a sustainable peri-urban water source.
If peri-urban residents could decide the government's priorities in their neighborhoods they
would overwhelmingly choose water supply. One half of residents who participated in the Estamos
survey chose "Guaranteeing an adequate supply of water" as their number one priority for
government action. The second most frequently selected action area was improving public health
and hospitals, with only 17 percent of residents citing it as their number one priority 15 (David, 2006).
12 It is important to note that Costa do Sol also had the highest percentage of families using well water, and the only
bairro of the five surveyed where families used rivers, drains, or tanker trucks as a water source (David, 2006).
13 The landfill is located in the peri-urban bairro of Hulene.
14 Some of the utility's 350 standpipes in peri-urban Maputo source water from boreholes.
15 Respondents could choose from 1) Guaranteeing an adequate supply of water; 2) improving public health and
hospitals; 3) improving household sanitation; 4) improving secondary schools; 5) improving transport and roads; 6)
scaling up electricity; or 7) reducing crime. Options were read out loud for respondents but the first option to be read
was chosen randomly. Bairros included in the survey were Costa do Sol, Albazine, Hulene, FPLM, and Mahotas; 1373
persons in total responded. It should be noted that the inclusion of bairro Costa do Sol in the survey is the likely
reason why "water supply" is the number one priority since neither AdM nor SPSPs are active in this area; most
residents rely on personal or neighborhood wells.
Given that two out of every three peri-urban residents do not have direct access to the utility
network, this finding may not be surprising.
Peri-urban residents prefer household connections over other water supply service types.
Household connections are desirable not only because they allow for more water consumption, they
reduce physical burden, the opportunity costs of water fetching, and the health dangers associated
with improper water storage. A household survey targeting 10 peri-urban bairros with a sample of
640 households demonstrates that, when residents were asked what they would consider as an
improvement in their present water supply situation, 50 percent of the respondents mentioned
"having their own house connection" and 49 percent mentioned "cheaper water" (categories were not
mutually exclusive) (Hydroconseil, 2005).
The Mozambican government looked to external financing sources for utilities' upgrading but
funding agencies were reluctant to finance projects without a clear institutional framework for the
water sector. In 1998 the World Bank agreed to fund the National Water Development Projects to
improve coverage and performance, but also created a new institutional architecture, dubbed the
'Framework for Delegated Management', to attract PSP for Mozambique's urban water provision.
Large scale PSP would become part of a triumvirate institutional design where a private operator
manages the utility, a public investment agency, FIPAG (Fundo de Investimento e Patrim6nio do
Abastecimento de Agua), takes over municipal water supply fixed assets and investment duties, and
an independent regulator, CRA (Conselho de Regula ao do Abastecimento de Agua), monitors the
utility's operations and mediates conflicts between the utility and FIPAG16 . The National Water
Directorate (DNA), under the Ministry of Housing and Public Works (MOHP), is responsible for
promoting this framework's implementation, mobilizing funds, and preparing legal support when
necessary. The municipal government plays a very minor role and has little sector influence in the
face of these larger actors. It is still, however, the people's representative and is responsible for
voicing community concerns to the other institutions (Thompson, 2005). This framework still exists
today
(Figure 3.4):
16 The World Bank's institutional paradigm believed regulation works best when divorced from financing,
management, and operating activities. This theoretically allows the regulator to monitor tariffs and other sector
activities without political interference.
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Figure 3.4: Institutional Framework for Maputo's Water Sector
Source: Fundo de Investimento e Patim6nio do Abastecimento de Agua (FIPAG)
Immediately following the transfer of municipal assets to FIPAG, a private operator was
sought to take over utility operations. FIPAG entered into a 15 year lease contract in September 1999
with Aguas de Mogambique (AdM), a consortium of French, Portuguese, and Mozambican
companies, to manage potable water supply service in Maputo; the major shareholder was France's
SAUR International. Immediately following the lease agreement in February 2000, disastrous floods
struck Maputo that damaged the distribution infrastructure, washing away sections of large mains
completely, and the main treatment plant's raw water pumps. That year AdM was unable to meet
financial obligations to its main shareholder, SAUR International, and called for a tariff increase. The
contract renegotiation that ensued was unsuccessful and resulted in SAUR leaving the consortium in
October 2001. Aguas de Portugal took over SAUR's equity and is now the major shareholder of AdM,
whose lease expires in late 2016 (FIPAG, 2001).
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Aguas de Mogambique is faring better than its public predecessor but is still struggling to
increase coverage and improve efficiency. Currently only 50 percent of the city is either directly
(private connection or standpipe) or indirectly (household resale) served by the network:
Table 3.2: Maputo water coverage levels in 2004
Maputo coverage levels in 2K4*
The Cement City Rest of Maputo & Matola Total
Populadon 155,063 1,576,656 1,731,719
% served byAdMprivate connection >99 18 25
% served by AdMstandpipe 0 14 12
% served by AdM neighbor connectdon <1 13 13
% served in total 100 45 50
Totalpopuladon served 155,063 709,495 865,860
*Numbers adapted from AdM raw data
Since it took over operations in 2001, AdM has demonstrated progress with respect to
coverage, water quality, and collections. However, significant challenges prevent their strategies
from being wholly effective in peri-urban areas. At the moment, AdM is only present in 41 of the 97
peri-urban bairros and provides service in the form of private connections and publicly managed
standpipes. Service in the bairros is very different than service in the cement city. Private
connections face lower pressure and more limited supply times; most operate for 14 hours a day.
There are approximately 350 publicly managed standpipes with daylight service, usually 14 hours a
day for standpipes connected to a network, and 4 hours a day for standpipes connected to a borehole
(Naienne, 2006). Over half of Maputo's residents have to rely on alternative water sources.
Peri-urban residents currently use four different waters sources - groundwater, utility water,
rainwater, and river water 7 - retrieved in five different ways - private connections, neighbors'
connections, private well, neighbors' wells, and standpipes. This inequitable access to the utility
network results in what Karen Bakker calls an "archipelago" - spatially separated but linked 'islands'
of networked supply in the urban fabric - that better characterizes Maputo's heterogeneous,
17 The percentage using river water is very small - less than 1 percent.
alternative service delivery mechanisms that overlap with and inter-penetrate the network (Bakker,
2003).
Figure 3.5: Maputo's Archiuelago'(AdeM=AdM& SSIP=Small private-sector provider)
Source: Hydroconseil Geographic Information Systems
This service gap is partially a result of the PSP contract structure. A lease delegates capital
investment obligations to FIPAG, a government agency, and not AdM. FIPAG and AdM must
negotiate and reach an agreement prior to expanding coverage or improving service in a particular
area. Because of commercial disincentives to serving relatively poorer peri-urban areas, the
government's limited resources for infrastructure investment, and time it takes to extend major
infrastructure like water networks, AdM will not serve a majority of Maputo residents with private
connections or standpipes for the foreseeable future. In its place, the "other" private sector - small
private-sector providers (SPSP) - are filling the service gap for many households in the peri-urban
area.
Maputo's SPSPs, predominately in the form of independent small network operators (ISNO),
are an integral and dominant part of Maputo's "archipelago", serving between 175,000 and 210,000
peri-urban residents with standpipes that offer water during daylight hours and private connections
that for the most part provide 24 hour service (Hydroconseil, 2005). They have existed in Maputo
since as early as the 1970s but have multiplied significantly in the last 5 to 10 years. There are now
approximately 210 small water systems in Maputo.
Figure 3.6: Examples of small network systems in pei-urban Maputo, Mozambique.
Source: The author. For more photos see Appendix D
Maputo's ISNOs are truly independent - they do not deliver water from the existing utility
networks but instead dig boreholes (also referred to as deepwells) and extract groundwater with a
motorized pump. This water is then stored in elevated tanks and delivered via a rubber pipe
distribution network. They cater mostly to residential customers and average 76 household
connections per network. Three out of four providers have a privately managed standpipe with
multiple faucets, almost always adjacent to their borehole, as part of their water system. They operate
year round and are known for their ability to respond to demand, provide a decent service level, and
reduce Maputo's coverage gap. Less is known about their business structure and operating
environment.
FIPAG is currently in the process of building two new distribution centers and expanding its
network in the north and west of the city; one center is being built in an area with the densest
concentration of ISNOs18 . Because ISNOs are so predominant in this peri-urban area, FIPAG has
begun to study them and communicate with them in order to seek avenues for collaboration. FIPAG
views ISNOs as financially sustainable and would like to capitalize on their existing infrastructure to
expand coverage. CRA, on the other hand, is more critical of ISNOs' motivations, environmental
impact, and ability to serve the poorest of the poor.
Currently it is understood that Maputo's ISNOs play a considerable role in the peri-urban
water market and have done so for the last 10 years. Next to the utility, as a group, they are the
largest water provider in Maputo. It is clear that their presence must be acknowledged, less clear is
the future role they should play as an integral part of Maputo's water and sanitation service delivery
strategy. In this vein, a study was conducted to assess the positive and negative aspects of ISNOs'
business structure along with the limits and potential of their operating environment to help
determine the optimal role for ISNOs in the future of Maputo's water sector.
3.4 STUDY METHODOLOGY
This study used mixed-methods to obtain a holistic understanding of Maputo's water sector
and detailed information on a sample of ISNOs' businesses. Research began in July 2005 with desk
research and open-ended interviews with policy makers and 15 ISNOs. A literature review on PSP in
the water sector, SPSPs, W&S technologies, and infrastructure planning in low income countries
from both academic and professional sources was completed. Four senior officials in FIPAG's legal
and engineering departments and CRA were interviewed, along with AdM's commercial director and
two consultants working for FIPAG.
18 These distribution centers are slated for completion in 2006 but cannot become operational, however, until the main
water treatment plant is upgraded. The plant upgrading has been slow and is a bottleneck in the process; professional
estimates say it will be completed in 2009.
The ISNOs interviewed were selected using the "snowballing" method; three of the 15 were
non-profit enterprises that delivered water to schools and targeted disabled residents. Interviews
were semi-structured, informal, and conducted in Portuguese with the assistance of local research
assistants. I returned to Cambridge, MA in September to analyze the results and continue desk
research.
In January 2006 I traveled to Maputo a second time to carry out a survey effort with 30 ISNOs
and follow-up with policy makers. The provider study was an in-depth survey of a stratified random
sample of Maputo's ISNOs. This survey effort benefited from an existing provider list of all Maputo
ISNOs compiled by FIPAG and its consultants; The list of 190 providers who were operating prior to
July 2005 was categorized, based on self-reported numbers of household connections, into "large"
(>30 connections) and "small" (:30 connections) operations. Eighty-five providers (roughly 40%)
were classified into each category; the number of connections was not available for another 40
providers (20% of the total). A stratified random sample was drawn that mirrored the distribution of
providers among these three categories. The study's original target was 30 randomly chosen ISNOs.
Favorable field conditions and cooperative providers allowed for 38 interviews instead of 30.
Table 3.3: Sample composition
Provider # of household Total # (%) in # (%) included
Category connections Maputo* in sample
Small <30 85 16(40%) (42%)
Large >30 85 14
(40%) (37%)
Unknown Unknown 40 8*
(20%) (21%)
*of the 8 SPSPs of unknown size, 3 turned out to be small and 5 turned out
to be large, resulting in an even sample of 19 providers of each size type.
Sampled providers were contacted by phone or in person to arrange for an interview. Those
who were unreachable because of outdated or incorrect information (approximately 20% of the
original sample) were replaced with substitutes drawn at random from the relevant stratum. At the
start of each interview, enumerators described the purpose of the investigation and asked each
individual to participate in the study19. Not a single provider refused, although several asked for
enumerators to bring written documentation regarding the study's goals and funding sources. Thirty-
five of our respondents were system owners and the remaining 3 were regular managers who knew
operating details well.
In some cases a provider had more than one system under his or her ownership. Often they
had one system at their residence and others either in the same neighborhood or elsewhere in
Maputo's peri-urban area. In these cases, in order to maintain the system as the unit of analysis, the
provider was asked to list his or her systems. Through discussion the enumerator determined for
which system the respondent had the most cost, revenue, and pricing information. The ensuing
interview focused solely on the operations related to this system. This approach may have led to
providers with multiple systems conducting their interviews based on the system located at their
homes. This is the system they usually have the most information about. Qualitative research shows
that systems located at providers' homes are usually the first system the provider ever built.
Therefore, among providers with multiple systems, responses maybe biased towards a provider's first
system.
The provider survey included ten sections. The interview resulted in detailed quantitative
and qualitative information on costs, prices, and financing of ISNO businesses and categorized
characteristics of their operating environment. Field interviews were completed by four enumerators
(three males and one female) with professional training and prior experience in quantitative and
qualitative data collection methods and interviewing techniques. The enumeration team underwent
an intensive three-day training to familiarize them with the topic of water SPSPs and to provide an
opportunity to pre-test and revise the survey instrument. Following the training, I accompanied each
interviewer to the field to monitor their performance. After satisfactorily completing two interviews,
they proceeded independently. Interviews were carried out in either Portuguese or Tsanghana as per
the respondent's preference and were generally carried out in providers' homes, which in most cases.
was also the location of their water systems.
The median interview length as recorded by the enumerators was 2 hours and 20 minutes. I
reviewed each completed survey and entered the responses into a database. This database was then
19 In several cases, the contact information of sampled providers was incorrect and the individuals could not be reached. In
each instance, an alternate provider was randomly selected from the relevant category and included in the sample.
used to perform analyses using the statistical software packages SPSS and SAS. The study relies on
the statistical analyses, a thorough literature review, in-depth knowledge of Maputo and its water
sector, and ISNOs' attitudes and opinions.
CHAPTER 4:
SMALL PRIVATE-SECTOR PROVIDER STUDY FINDINGS
4.1 BACKGROUND
All study findings are based on our study sample of 38 providers unless specified otherwise.
The dominant form of SPSP in Maputo is the independent small network operator (ISNO). These
ISNOs mainly serve households who use the service to fulfill their daily drinking, cooking, bathing,
washing, and other domestic needs. Independent small network operators have existed in Maputo
since as early as the 1970s but have multiplied significantly in the last 5 to 10 years; Over 50 percent
of all providers in our sample entered the market in the last 5 years. The survey effort's main goal is
to understand the ISNO's prices, cost structure, and operating environment. The study
conceptualizes the per unit production costs for the ISNO as a function of several input costs, service
characteristics, and contextual factors.
4.2 ISNO PROFILE
Maputo has approximately 210 independent small networks run by approximately 180
operators (Hydroconseil, 2005). Four out of five operators interviewed are male. These providers
have no formal relationship with the utility AdM, as they install private boreholes (often referred to
as deepwells) and extract groundwater with an electric motorized pump. Water is stored in elevated
tanks and delivered via a rubber pipe distribution network largely to residents' private yards and
occasionally into their homes. Almost all SPSPs cater exclusively to residential customers; only one
provider interviewed reported business connections and three reported "other" types of connections:
a school, a small military barracks, and an association. The providers interviewed operate networks
with a median number of 50 household connections and 600 meters of distribution pipe.
In many cases, the providers interviewed have converted a water supply system initially
installed for his/her family's private use into a small network. When asked about the principal reason
that the provider decided to enter into the water supply business, 29 percent said they had responded
to requests of neighbors in their communities.
Table 4.1: Primary reason provider began selling water
(Percentage ofISNOs reporting, N=35)
"Area lacked water" 31
"Requests from neighbors or the community" 29
"Business / an opportunity to earn money" 20
"To help / reduce the suffering of the community" 17
"Other" 3
Providers who started selling water because their "Area lacked water" were both
entrepreneurial - responding to customer demand - and altruistic - providing a public service.
However, those who began selling water mainly to provide a community service are likely to have
mentioned "To help / reduce the suffering of the community" as their primary motivation. In other
words, it is more accurate to conclude that only 17 percent, and not 48 percent, of providers began
selling water to help their communities.
The majority of Maputo's ISNOs have only one system. There is evidence that a single system
can serve over 600 households with private connections. In fact, the approximately 15 providers
with more than one system are often able to provide an even larger number of connections; one
provider has been able to provide over 1000 connections with seven systems. Seventy-five percent of
providers have a privately managed standpipe adjacent to or a short walking distance from their
borehole as part of their business; independent networks can include both exclusive household
connections and standpipes. These standpipes often have multiple faucets emanating from it resulting
in multiple jerrican filling points at a single water source.
Small-scale water providers are not required by any public authority to register their
operations (Thompson, 2005). Forty percent of the ISNOs interviewed, however, have chosen or
been required to register their enterprises on an ad hoc basis at the neighborhood or district level.
Among those who are registered, 40 percent said they did so because "it was required" and 33 percent
do so "in order to avoid prosecution." In some cases, providers actively pursued the license and cited
reasons from, "To gain access to credit", to "To have the right of official appeal". No difference was
documented between registered and unregistered ISNOs with respect to size (network length and
number of connections), gender, age, education level, years in business, sales volume, customers
served, number of loan sources used in the past year, or whether their water quality is regulated.
This suggests either that some other characteristic determines an ISNO's registration requirement, or
that the registration process is completely arbitrary.
Three out of four providers interviewed reported having another job or business. These
alternate occupations range from operating a small food stand at the provider's home to professional
occupations like accountant and economist. Although information on providers' household incomes
was not collected, we do know that 16 percent of providers' household incomes originate entirely
from water sales. These providers would be the most vulnerable to changes in the market or
regulation. Another 51 percent that obtain half or more of their monthly household income from
water sales would also be at risk, but less so because other family members also contribute or they
have additional income sources.
4.3 FIRM CHARACTERISTICS
Small scale water provision in Maputo has largely been a phenomenon of the last decade.
About 90 percent of businesses in the study's sample have been in operation for 10 years or less.
While the typical operator has been in business five and a half years, one in our sample has been
operating for over 20 years and some started as late as 2004.
Chart 4.1: Year of enterprise establishment:
(Percentage ofISNOs reporting N=37)
1985-1989
1990-1994 0% Pre-1985
8% 3
2002 - present
1995-1998 35%
22%
1999-2001
32%
Virtually all of the up-front investment in the surveyed businesses took the form of private
capital from the respondents or their family members. Similarly, current ownership of water supply
assets rests predominantly with virtually all (97%) of the interviewed providers.
Chart 4.2: Source ofstart-up capital for system construction
(Percentage ofISNOs reporting, N=38)
Respondent's NGO or charity
fan* 3%
member(s)
8%
Respondent
89%
The typical provider serves 442 peri-urban residents a day, including both household and
standpipe customers. This puts the ISNO peri-urban customer base around 147,000 residents.20 This
is consistent with another published estimate that puts the customer base at approximately 170,000
(Hydroconseil, 2005).
Table 4.2: Number of customers served by sampled ISNOs (N=38)
Std
Median Mean Dev Minimum Maximum
442 632 601 95 2602
Almost all providers - 97 percent - began their operations with some form of labor, paid or
unpaid, full- or part-time. The majority of ISNOs, 71 percent, claimed to have 1 or more paid
laborers at operation's start; 45 percent reported having had unpaid labor. With respect to hours
employed, 71 percent of our sample employed at least one full-time worker while 39 percent used at
least one part time worker at operation's start; full time labor was more predominant among ISNOs
20 This figure was derived using the following assumptions: The sum of the sample's customer base is 24,154
residents. Private connection users were calculated using an average household size of 6.3 and standpipe users were
calculated using the average volume sold from providers' standpipes divided by 27 lpcd, the average Maputo
standpipe consumption rate from government and consultancy sources. Since our sample represents 18 percent of all
Maputo ISNO systems (38/210=.18), the sample's customer base was multiplied by 5.5263 to arrive at 133,482
customers. However, some of Maputo's systems were not included in the 2005 census so there may be more than 210
and some of the largest ISNOs did not get interviewed in this study because they were unavailable at the time. To
account for missing systems, potential multiplying effects from large systems' customer bases, and a small percentage
of re-sold water, the figure here has been rounded up to 147,000 customers.
than part-time labor. The most expensive form of labor for ISNOs and most valuable to peri-urban
employees in the informal labor market - full-time paid labor - was employed by 58 percent of
providers at operation's start.
Although systematic data on employees' roles were not obtained, qualitative evidence
suggests that most full-time employees manage standpipe operations (monitoring clients, collecting
payments, responding to service interruptions, etc.) while part-time employees help maintain
systems, install new household connections, service existing connections, and perform various other
operations-related tasks. One might wonder why system owners do not attend to technical matters
themselves, or in the event they do not have technical knowledge, why they do not at least manage
their own standpipes and revenue collections. The reason may be that opportunity costs are too high.
Among system owners, 80 percent have another job or business. Among those with another job or
business, sixty-eight percent use either paid or unpaid full-time labor; in fact sixty-one percent use
full-time paid labor. Unpaid labor is usually in the form of family members, such as housewives or
older children, who might experience lower opportunity costs. This trend is not entirely surprising
since many providers have professional or technical jobs such as an accountant, economist, and
import / export officer.
The reliance on paid labor appears to have grown over time. The net increase in paid labor
among our sample was 9 employees. Unpaid labor decreased by 6 employees. Small-network systems
by design rely less on labor as a production factor than other SPSP types such as mobile vendors and
manual carters, which often demonstrate more labor intensive operations (Davis, 2005). System
growth was commensurate with labor growth. The typical ISNO's staff to connection ratio remained
largely unchanged between operation's start and now with 17 and 16 full-time workers per 1000
connections, respectively (extrapolated from actual data).
Table 4.3: Paid and unpaid full-time and part-time labor employed by ISNOs
(Percentage ofISNOs reporting)
Full-time paid labor Full-time unpaid Part-time paid labor Part-time unpaid labor
(N=38) labor (N-=38) (N=38) (NV=38)
Workers Start-up Now Start-up Now Start-up Now Start-up Now
0 42 42 79 82 79 82 76 74
1 37 21 13 16 5 5 8 16
2 13 26 8 3 11 5 13 11
3+ 8 11 0 0 5 8 3 0
TOTAL 100 100 100 101 100 100 100 101
Table 4.4: Change in systems from operations start to now:
standpipes and household connections
Change in
Change in Change in standpipes connections
standpipes (% - among those Change in ( ongtos
(absolute, with > 0 standpipes at (absolute, N=38) with >0 connections
N=38) start-up, N=31) at start-up, N=21)
Median 0 0 39 300
Mean 0.13 1.60 64.6 858
Std. Deviation 1.21 71 85.8 1567
Minimum -2 -100 -30 -49
Maximum 6 200 370 7000
4.4 SPSP CosTS
Providers were asked a series of detailed questions regarding both the costs of starting their
business, as well as the recurrent costs associated with ongoing operations21. Two methods were used
to collect start-up costs. First, the provider was asked how much he or she spent to start his or her
system on the whole. Then, the provider was asked to give a more detailed breakdown of start-up
costs with respect to a system's major components. The individual component costs not only provide
a more detailed cost picture but were tallied to cross-check the broader figure stated earlier in the
survey. Providers reported spending anywhere between $5,000 and $45,000 to start their businesses,
with the typical provider spending between $10,000 and $12,000. This value is equal to between 6
and 7 times the annual gross average Mozambican urban household incomes or between 9 and 11
times the annual gross Mozambican minimum wages, indicating that barriers to entry are very high;
not just any family can build a small water network.
Tallied start-up costs were very close to the whole figures, but the median and mean were
slightly less22 . We also asked providers how much money they would need to set up their system as it
exists today. This figure lends confidence to our self-reported start-up costs, which can often be
21 All cost and price figure throughout the report are in 2005 US$ values using officially published current population
index (CPI) and exchanges rates from the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) on-line database. The exchange rate
used in this report is 24,076 Mozambican Meticais (MT) for 1 US $.
22 There are two potential reasons for this. First, providers often did not remember costs for smaller system
components such as a standpipe or metal faucet and reported spending nothing on those parts instead of saying 'I do
not know'. Second, one system component - the elevated water tank structure - was omitted from the components'
list and is a cost that virtually all providers must bear. The elevated structure's cost may account for the entire
difference between the tallied cost figure and the whole figure.
unreliable because of recall difficulties". The typical provider said he or she would need $11,000 to
set-up his/her system as it exists today.
Table 4.5: About how much money did you spend to start your water supply business
initially? (in 2005 US$ values) *
Self-reported figure for Calculated sum from self- Money needed to set up
total system costs reported component costs system as it exists today
N=29 N=35 N=33
Median $12,187 $10,000 $11,007
Mean $14,539 $13,804 $13,574
Std. Deviation $9,205 $8,407 $7,811
Minimum $4,853 $5,105 $5,400
Maximum $45,129 $43,625 $41,535
*Prices were adjusted using the IMF monthly consumer price index
Providers financed their systems primarily from private capital. Ninety-two percent reported
using their own savings to finance their systems; 80 percent of those using their own savings used it
as their only financing source. Given the high cost of starting a system - well out of the reach of an
average Mozambican urban household - providers often invest their life savings or savings from sales
of other assets such as livestock or vehicles to finance system construction. Another 14 percent of
providers reported using family savings as a source of funds for their initial investment; one half of
those using family savings reported it as their only financing source. Other sources included one
instance of partner's savings, a bank loan, a community donation2 4 , and loans from a former
employer. Most providers used only one source of financing.
24A mosque financed a small network system on behalf of an Islamic community. The 15 original members receive
water for free.
Chart 4.3: Number offinancing sources (N=38)
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4.4.1 RECURRENT MONTHLY COSTS
The typical provider spends $174 per month on operating costs, or 1.2 times the average
Mozambican urban household expenditure, to keep his piped water network running. Some
providers spend as little as $59 a month while other providers' costs can escalate to over $1000 a
month. The typical provider's monthly cost per cubic meter sold is $0.28.
Electricity comprises by far the largest share of a provider's monthly outlay; a typical provider
spends 47 percent per cubic meter on electricity. This is followed by salaries for full- and part-time
labor at 24 percent per cubic meter a month. Purchases of spare parts and tools also affect providers'
monthly expenses, with motorized pump repair and replacement being the primary expenditure for
that cost category. The three categories combined account for 75 percent of a provider's monthly
costs. Other costs were negligible.
Table 4.6. Leading cost components for ISN operations (N=35)
Meian
% of Median Mean Std. Dev Min Max
total
Largest cost Electricity 47 $0.10 $0.15 $0.12 $0.01 $0.53
2nd largest cost Full & Part time labor 24 $0.05 $0.08 $0.08 $0.00 $0.35
Spare parts, tools (largely
motorized pump 3 $0.00 $0.04 $0.11 $0.00 $0.63
3rd largest cost replacement)
Total Costs - 100 $0.28 $0.35 $0.36 $0.06 $1.98
4.4.2 LICENSES
Currently 15 providers in our sample have a license, and 9 of them paid to have it. The
typical license costs a provider US $19 per year, or $1.55 a month. This license is recognized by the
bairro or district but not the municipality or central government. The district is able to furnish this
informal license because the Municipality does not heavily involve itself in district or bairro affairs (a
district is one level above a bairro). The license is paid once annually and the fee is negligible, on
average, 2 percent of net monthly profit. In some cases, providers actively pursued the license and
cited reasons from, "To gain access to credit", to "To have the right of official appeal". Those not
registering cited on major reason for not doing so - never head that registration (i.e. a license) was
required or existed. Some were ready or tried to obtain a license but cited lack of procedures for not
doing so.
4.5 SPSP PRICING PRACTICES
Questions about price levels and structures, including discounts and the availability of
financing by providers, were asked of respondents in both the provider and household survey. All
providers in the survey claimed that their prices stayed the same rather than increased or decreased
during the past year25. Also, only 3 percent of providers (1 respondent) claimed to have received
assistance in deciding how much to charge customers for water; this assistance was from an SPSP
association in the provider's area and not an official government institution. The analysis below
examines the extent to which the providers are meeting cost recovery goals, based on the revenue
and expenditure data they supplied.
4.5.1 PRICE STRUCTURE: UP-FRONT FEES
Maputo's ISNOs have a fairly complex way of charging customers for a private connection
and one that varies significantly from provider to provider. All providers charge what is called a
contract fee. There are four major costs associated with this private connection contract: 1) an
administrative fee for connecting to the provider's water source; 2) a materials cost that mainly
consists of rubber tubing and the yard tap steel faucet; 3) labor costs for installing the connection; and
25 Inflation was 12 percent in 2005.
where applicable, 4) the cost of a meter to track water usage. The contract fee can encompass any
combination of the administrative fee, materials, labor, and meter 26 .
The typical provider charges $42 in administrative costs, and irrespective of payer (provider
or customer), typical materials cost $32, the typical labor charge is $8, and the typical meter, where
applicable, costs $1727. The average net cost of connection to the client is $77. This is equivalent to
55 percent of the average Mozambican monthly urban household income, or a little over one and a
half monthly minimum wages for a peri-urban household. Forty-five percent of providers allow
clients to pay using financing, usually without a finance charge.
By comparison, households connected to the main water utility, AdM, pay a total of $44 for a
inch pipe and $52 for a inch pipe private connection, or roughly 37% less than the cost of the
typical ISNO connection. The AdM fee includes the deposit, visit charge, administrative fee, and
average labor cost (labor is the client's responsibility).
Table 4.7: Private connection costs, irrespective ofpayer (US $)
N Median Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Administrative 33 42 34 26 0 113
Materials 32 32 39 24 8 93
Labor 33 8 10 6 0 33
Meter 29 17 18 5 12 39
Table 4.8 Private connection costs to client (US $)
SPSPs AdM
N Median Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum pipe pipe
Cost to client (gross) 27 89 94 38 22 158 -
Cost to provider 33 0 13 25 0 85 - -
Cost to client (net) 27 77 82 34 22 149 44 52
26 Often responsibility for the non-administrative costs is relegated to the client and is not reflected in the total
contract fee. For this reason, we asked what the overall contract fee was and then added or subtracted materials,
labor, and meter costs as reflected in the provider's policy.
27 They typical provider bears responsibility for none of these costs.
4.5.2 PRICE STRUCTURE: USAGE FEES
The usage fee an ISNO charges his or her customers is largely dependent on whether the
provider uses meters or not. In some cases, providers even allow the customer to decide if they want
a meter. Ninety-three percent of providers using a volumetric fee charged customers the same
amount per cubic meter irrespective of volume consumed. Conversely, 7 percent charged a
decreasing block tariff where greater volumes consumed resulted in lower fees per cubic meter. The
typical provider charges $0.83 per cubic meter. A few providers charging high volumetric fees drive
the average up. The average price per cubic meter up to 10 m3 is $0.90, from 11 m3 to 15 m3 it is also
$0.90, from 16 m3 to 25 m3 there is a slight drop to $0.89, and every cubic meter consumed after 25
m3 also gets charged an average of $0.89.
The decreasing block tariff employed by a minority of ISNOs is in contrast to most African
water utilities that charge higher unit prices as the quantity consumed increases in order to finance
cross-subsidization schemes and / or discourage wasteful usage (Collignon, 2000). Maputo's utility is
no exception to the increasing block tariff. It charges a minimum monthly fee of $2.94 for ten cubic
meters, which can theoretically be viewed as $0.29 per cubic meter up to the first 10 cubic meters,
and the next cubic meter up to 20 cubic meters is more than double that rate at $0.72. Each cubic
meter from 20 to 30 is $0.76 and each cubic meter greater than 30 costs $0.77. In addition, AdM
charges a monthly meter rental fee between $0.50 and $0.72. Therefore, the minimum monthly
household charge for 10 cubic meters is between $3.44 and $3.66.
Table 4.9: SPSP volumetric charge for residential clients in US $ (N=28)
Median Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Price /m3 up to 10 m3 0.83 0.90 0.17 0.42 1.25
Price /m3 for 1 m3 to 15 m3 0.83 0.90 0.16 0.42 1.25
Price /m3 for 16m3 to 25 m3 0.83 0.89 0.16 0.42 1.25
Price /m3 for 26m3 or more 0.83 0.89 0.17 0.42 1.25
The National Water Policy states that a household should not pay more than 4 percent of two
monthly minimum wages, or $3.72, for monthly consumption. On average, a Maputo family uses less
than 10 cubic meters of water per month. This may be because AdM has a minimum monthly charge
equal to 10 cubic meters of consumption and the cost per cubic meter more than doubles after 10
cubic meters have been consumed. Thus, an AdM customer usually pays $3.44 to $3.66 in monthly
user charges, or 2 percent of 1 Mozambican monthly minimum wage. The typical ISNO customer
would end up paying $8.30 for 10 cubic meters of water per month, or 9 percent of 2 Mozambican
monthly wages. Thus, it is 2.4 times more expensive to buy water from an ISNO. One caveat is that
whereas AdM customers must pay for 10 cubic meters regardless of how much water they use in a
month, ISNO customers can pay per cubic meter. An ISNO household can get about 4.3 cubic meters
a month, or about 25 lpcd, for the same price as 10 cubic meters from AdM. Thus, if and only if a
household wanted to use less than 25 lpcd would an ISNO be more affordable (at 4.3 cubic meters per
month, the average consumption would be 24 lpcd). However, this amount is less than ideal since
the WHO recommends a minimum of 20 to 50 lpcd for human needs.
Household surveys show that although customers of standpipes and neighbors' connections
use 25 lpcd on average, customers with private connections demand more. One survey showed ISNO
yard tap customers using 9.5 cubic meters per month (50 lpcd), which is not very different from the
AdM house connection average of 9.7 cubic meters (Hydroconseil, 2005). Another household survey
showed ISNO customers using considerably more than AdM house or yard connection customers,
15.8 versus 11.8 cubic meters (83 lpcd vs. 62 lpcd), but the sample size for the ISNOs is very small and
may thus be unreliable (DNA, 2004).
Fifty-three percent of providers use a fixed monthly fee for non-metered customers; 26
percent of providers use only a fixed flat fee. For non-metered customers the typical fixed monthly
fee is $10.38. This fee is charged irrespective of quantity of water consumed. Many providers
indicated that they charged this fee as a pro-poor measure. They hypothesize that poor households
include a large number of individuals and it is to their benefit to have an unlimited supply for a fixed
price. This is likely a misconception since official statistics show that Maputo households,
irrespective of neighborhood or income class, do not usually consume more than 10 cubic meters per
month (DNA, 2004).
Table 4.10: Cost Comparison
10 m3 as % of Total Cubic meters
Prc frAverage Ttl 10 m3 as %Price for onthly Total of two average monthly possible with
10 m3 a e monthly monthly cost for an AdM
meter monthly
month costs for minimum urban HH 20 m3 minimum
(55 lpcd) fee 10 m3 wages income monthly
(PA HO:<= 5*) charge
AdM 2.94 0.61 3.55 4 2 10.75 10
ISNO w/ meter 8.3 0 8.3 9 6 16.60 4.3
ISNO fixed fee 10.38 0 10.38 11 7.5 10.38 0
*The Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) recommends that households should spend no more than
5 percent of their monthly income on water consumption (Gomez-Lobo, 2001).
Many small networks also have accompanying standpipes at the water source's site or within
a short walking distance of it. Standpipes are particularly useful to low-income households who rely
on smaller quantities of water and manage household finances on a daily basis. In addition, very few
lines were observed at providers' standpipes, essentially minimizing the poor households' opportunity
costs of water collection. Approximately two out of three providers had at least one standpipe as part
of their system. Charges at standpipes are per container: one 20 liter jerrican costs $0.02; in
comparison, 20 liters from a metered private connection costs one and a half cents. Seventeen
percent of providers with standpipes give a bulk discount to standpipe customers essentially
providing a "buy two, get one free" scheme by charging $0.04 instead of $0.06 for three jerricans 28 .
Although all providers charge by the jerrican, 15 percent of providers owning standpipes also provide
a flat fixed monthly standpipe fee. One provider sells unlimited jerricans for $0.83 per month, two
others for $2.08 per month, and a fourth for $2.28 per month.
On a purely volumetric basis, ignoring up-front connection costs, standpipes are more costly
than private metered connections. One cubic meter at a standpipe from providers who do not offer
the bulk discount would cost $1.04. Conversely, the typical provider charges $0.83 per cubic meter
from a private connection. Even with the bulk jerrican discount that some providers offer at
standpipes, a cubic meter would cost $0.67. This is 20% lower than the typical $0.83 per cubic meter
from a private connection. One must also weigh the opportunity cost of fetching and inconvenience
associated with standpipe versus in-home water. Although poor households might benefit from or
28 It should be noted that the $0.02 per jerrican price could be set out of convenience - the smallest denominated
Mozambican currency available is equal to $0.02; charging less would be equivalent to asking someone to pay for
something with something smaller than a penny
prefer to buy small quantities of water on demand at standpipe prices, they also lose time and risk
injury by having to fetch water from the source.
4.5.3 DiscoUNTs
Maputo's providers give a variety of discounts to low-income customers (broadly defined).
Unlike the bulk discount at standpipes that some providers grant, which apply to anyone, 37 percent
of providers cited giving discounts to both standpipe andprivate connection customers who they
considered to be vulnerable. When asked about the basis upon which such discounts are granted,
respondents cited a variety of metrics, most of which appear to be applied on an ad hoc basis. Two
particular categories, however, were repeatedly cited. Seventy-nine percent of providers who grant
discounts do so to the vulnerable elderly, such as elders living alone, while 29 percent grant discounts
on the basis of a visibly poor home. Three providers in the sample cited granting discounts to small
households, defined as less than five persons; another demographic category receiving discounts was
widows. These categories are not mutually exclusive: sixteen percent of providers granting discounts
did so to more than one low-income group. Only one provider interviewed mentioned granting
discounts to long term customers (the actual discount amount was not provided).
Table 4.11: Discount categories and amounts (N=14)
Number (percentage) of Percentage off of
Target audience Discount type providers offering normalprice
Elderly living alone Free unlimited jerricans 4(29) 100
No administrative fee for
Elderly living alone private connection 1(7) 100
Visibly poor households and $8.31 a month / Free
small households unlimited jerricans 1 (7) 33/100
Low income widows and small $2.49 a month / Free
households unlimited jerricans 1 (7) 60/100
Households smaller than 5
persons $6.23 a month 1(7) 25
Visibly poor households and
elderly living alone $8.31 a month 1(7) 33
$0.42 per cubic meter /one
Visibly poor households free jerrican per week 1(7) 50/100
Elderly living alone and others
based on discretionary measures $4.15 a month 1(7) 33
Elderly living alone One free jerrican per day 1(7) 100
Widows Free unlimited jerricans 1(7) 100
4.6 STANDPIPE SALES
Although peri-urban Maputo is considerably poorer than the cement city, variation among
household incomes still exists allowing wealthier peri-urban residents to connect their home to a
provider's borehole while poorer residents rely on a provider's standpipe or a neighbor. Currently, 68
percent of our sample had at least one standpipe connected to their water source. Of those furnishing
a standpipe, 152 cubic meters of water per month is the typical sales volume during both the summer
season and rest of the year. This volume accounts for approximately 15 percent of all water sold per
month. According to a FIPAG study of 640 peri-urban households, 22 percent of peri-urban
residents use AdM standpipes versus 19 percent that use SPSP standpipes. This is not surprising given
that a jerrican can cost half as much at an AdM standpipe (Hydroconseil, 2005). Still, unpredictable
operating hours, quality, and pressure at AdM standpipes, as well as their relative scarcity, drive
many to buy their water from small private providers.
Providers receive a disproportionate amount of their revenue from standpipe sales - the
typical provider with a standpipe sells 15 percent of monthly water from standpipes but earns 24
percent of his monthly revenues from standpipes sales. Because 32 percent of providers do not have a
standpipe, figures among all providers were correspondingly lower with 12 percent of monthly water
sales coming from standpipes and also a disproportionately higher 15 percent of monthly revenues
coming from standpipes29.
Table 4.12: Sales and Revenues from Standpipe operations
Percentage of all Percentage of Percentage of
water sold from revenues from Percentage sold revenues from
standpipes in standpipes in from standpipes standpipes
summer/dry summer/dry during rest of the during rest of
season (volume) season year the year
N 22 26 23 26
Among Mean 24 31 22 2
Providers with Mean 24 31 22 32
Standpipes Std. Dev 20 25 20 27
Min 0 1 0 1
Max 9 98 90 98
29 These are calculated figures from self-reported volumes and revenues. The provider calculated estimate had a
median of 17.5 percent, lending further confidence to our self-reported figures.
4.7 FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE
One concern researchers share when analyzing business data is the accuracy of self reported
revenue figures. SPSPs that operate in the informal sector, often illegally in direct competition with a
utility with exclusive selling rights, especially have an incentive to deemphasize revenues. Several
strategies were used during the interview process to cross check and verify the revenue and
expenditure data supplied by respondents.
We asked each provider how much he or she sold during the dry / summer season and the
rest of the year separately for household connections and standpipes. The result is four revenue
categories: 1) amount sold from private connections in the summer; 2) amount sold from standpipes
in the summer; 3) amount sold from private connections during the rest of the year; and 4) amount
sold from standpipes during the rest of the year. The following table shows the Pearson correlation
coefficients between the self-reported figures and the calculated revenue figure for the four revenue
categories.
Table 4.13: Correlation coefficients of calculated revenues with self-reported revenues
(Percentage ofISNOs reporting)
Summer / Dry season Rest of the Year
Private Connections Standpipes Private connections Standpipes
(N=33) (N=21) (N=35) (N=23)
Correlation with self
reported revenues 86 83 85 93
The high correlation between calculated revenues and self-reported revenues lends more confidence
and support to our self-reported values, which are the figures used in the following financial analyses
unless stated otherwise.
The working ratio (W7R) is defined as operating costs divided by operating revenues. If WR is
less than one then revenues cover the operating costs, and some margin is left over to cover the cost
of investment. If WR is greater than one, the financial viability of the ISNO is at stake. The typical
ISNO's WR is .41, indicating that revenues are at least twice as much as recurrent costs. Therefore,
providers are able to cover their costs well and preserve a margin to cover initial investment costs.
Note that system repair and maintenance costs are included in monthly cost figures and therefore
incorporated into the WR.
Gross profits - profits that do not include investment payback or asset depreciation - for a
typical provider equal $182 per month, or 1.3 times the Mozambican urban household income. Net
profits - profits that account for initial capital investment recovery - for a typical provider equal $83
per month, or 60 percent of the Mozambican average urban household income. This estimate is
corroborated by providers' household income information. Just over half of our sample, 51 percent,
said their water business accounts for between 50 - 75 percent of their household income.
Table 4.14: Working ratio, gross profit, and net profit for Maputo's ISNOs0
N Median Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Monthly Working Ratio 37 0.41 0.44 0.24 0.05 1.24
Monthly Gross profit 37 $266 $516 $671 $(94) $3420
Monthly Netprots* 31 $83 $301 $474 $(355) $2034
*Capital recovery factor assumptions: 1) To maximize our sample size, any of the three measures of capital
costs were used - self reported initial costs, calculated initial costs, and self-reported system value today; 2)
providers use all private connection administrative fees towards capital recovery; 3) A provider takes 8 years
to pay back initial capital after connection fees are accounted for (12.5 percent a year); and 4) depreciation
and interest rates are ignored. The sample size is smaller because not all providers furnished infrastructure
capital or private connection fee figures and one system whose capital was paid for by a religious institution
was excluded from the analysis.
Although Maputo ISNOs have robust WRs and profits, they might experience operating costs
not captured in the survey. Almost one out of every two providers (47 percent) used some type of
non-revenue funds in the past year to help cover operating costs or maintain their systems. Of those
using non-revenue funds, 39 percent used revenues from another business or job and 61 percent used
loans from various lending agencies. It would also be safe to say that there were additional providers
who would have liked to arrange financing for similar needs but were denied. Thus, in a more
accessible financial market, there might have been a greater percentage of providers borrowing funds.
30 One of our ISNOs is a Mosque that provides water for free to 30 percent of its client base. It also has the highest
monthly service costs of any provider (the service category could not be verified post-interview). Although the
Mosque claims its operating costs are fully recovered though commercial operations only, in other words, they
receive no outside assistance in maintaining daily business operations, it accounts for the sample's highest WR and
gross profit losses. Given these figures, the Mosque would not be able to sustain operations. However, they have
been in business since 1995. There are several possible explanations: 1) the water system manager is unaware of
external funding that actually does aid monthly operations; 2) the high service costs are a very recent phenomenon;
3) the Mosque does cove operating costs through revenues but is less worried about monthly losses because they are
part of a larger institution that can save them in the event of bankruptcy. For this reason the Mosque has been
excluded from the financial analysis, including the mosque would result in a higher average WR and lower average
profits.
A diverse set of financing sources was used but private banks were used most frequently. The typical
amount of non-revenue funds used in the last year was $1,142. Since the typical monthly operating
cost is $174, these loans were likely used for infrastructure improvements or replacements in addition
to covering some operating costs.
4.8 OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE
Most providers have few problems collecting revenues from their customers. Those selling
from standpipes either collect payments themselves or hire someone to monitor standpipe sales and
collect payments. Thus, the 58 percent of providers reporting late-paying customers are referring to
customers with private connections. There is room for collection improvement given that a quarter
of providers report that 50 percent or more of their customers pay late. Twenty-three percent of
providers penalize late paying customers with either a percentage or flat fee surcharge. Two
providers levy a percentage surcharge onto the customer's outstanding bill; one provider charges 10
percent a week and the other charges 20 percent a month. The other five providers in the sample
reporting the use of late penalties use a flat fee penalty; the average flat fee is $1.58 a month.
Table 4.15: Percentage of customers paying late (N=38)
Percentage ofproviders claiming
More than 75 percent of customers 5
Close to 50 percent of customers 21
Close to 25 percent of customers 32
Very few or no customers 42
Don't know/Not sure 0
Self-reported accounts of non-revenue water due to leakage, theft, or defaulted payments is in
the range of 0 to 25 percent, with a typical provider reporting 5 percent non-revenue water and an
average non-revenue water rate of 7 percent among our sample. There are several potential drivers
for this low rate. First, three-fourths of providers use meters and almost 50 percent meter every
single one of their connections. Providers that do not use meters (one out of four) know their
customer base very well and are extremely adept at preventing household resale of their water; in a
recent peri-urban household survey it was found that all the households that sold water to their
neighbors did so from an AdM connection (Hydroconseil, 2005). Second, most ISNOs employ a
standpipe attendant that ensures that water does not unnecessarily leak from standpipes; leakage in
the principal network is negligible. Third, providers operate in small geographic areas and can
quickly eliminate clandestine connections. Fourth, providers systems are located at their home and
therefore theft from the water source is unlikely. Fifth, customers are responsible for their meters
and any tampering that results in breakage would require the customer to purchase a new meter or
face disconnection. Finally, four out of five providers say they cut late-paying customers'
connections, waiting an average of 2 months before disconnecting. The majority are true to their
policy with 17 out of 22 providers cutting at least one connection due to late-payment in the past
year; the average number of disconnected customers in the past year was 6.
Table 4.16: Approximately what percentage of water is lost due to leakage, theft, or
illegal connections that you are unable to charge for?
N Median Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Percent of non-revenue water
reported 27 5 7 7 0 25
All providers in our sample operate seven days a week. Because standpipes are usually
located at or adjacent to providers homes and require an attendant they supply water only during
daylight hours, regardless of season. On the other hand, the median private connection is supplied 24
hours a day and the average is 19 hours a day; supply hours rarely vary throughout the year. This is
the same supply time as Manila's ISNOs (Davis, 2006). Providers that interrupt service often do so
late at night and into the early morning hours before sunrise. Some interrupt service for a couple of
hours in the early afternoon. Qualitative research indicates that providers interrupt service to
replenish water in their tanks, which could be a result of a poorly performing pumps, weak
electricity, or high demand; insufficient well water is not a likely reason.
One measure of service quality includes volume of water supplied per connection per day.
The typical provider supplies 500 liters per connection per day to his or her privately connected
customers. With an average Maputo household size of 6.3, this is 80 lpcd. The typical provider also
provides about 250 jerricans (5000 liters) per day from his or her standpipe operation.
Table 4.17 Daily volume sold from small network systems
N Median Mean Std. Dev Minimum Maximum
Volume sold to a private connection
per day (in liters) 35 500 651 506 95 1,915
Volume sold at standpipes per day
(in jerricans) 25 249 326 346 13 1,674
4.9 ECONOMIES OF SCALE
Economies of scale in water supply result when increased sales volumes lead to decreased unit
costs. It is important because if increasing volume sold reduces cost there might be an argument for
increasing SPSP size or market share to help make water more affordable. There is a statistically
significant negative relationship between cubic meters of water sold and cost per cubic meter among
Maputo's ISNOs:
Figure 4.1: Scatter plot of natural og of cost per cubic meter in a month (Y-axis)
by natural log ofmonthly sales volume in cubic meters (X-axis)
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More specifically, the elasticity of the cost curve demonstrates that for every 2 percent increase in
cubic meters sold per month there is a 1 percent decrease in the cost per cubic meter in that month
31
.
31 This is a constant elasticity measurement, which means that if a provider increased his or her sales volume from
1000 to 1200 cubic meters in March, the cost per cubic meter in March would drop by 10 percent; the same holds
true if a provider increased his or her sales volume from 2000 to 2400 cubic meters.
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4.10 CONSTRAINTS TO SPSP OPERATIONS
When questioned about the constraints that most impede their businesses' operation and
growth, providers in the study cited cost of electricity / fuel, weak or unreliable electricity, and lack
of access / high cost of financing as a "major constraint" most often. The cost of electricity as a
constraint is not surprising given that, on average, electricity accounts for about 50 percent of a
provider's monthly costs. Weak electricity frequently disrupts the motorized pump's functioning and
is the most prominent reason for unintended business closures that average 4 days per year. Water
cannot be pumped into the tanks and there is either a water shortage or weak water pressure to
private connections and standpipes. In extreme cases, poorly functioning electricity actually damages
the pump and it then needs to be repaired or replaced.
Table 4.18: How much of a constraint is the following issue for the operation and growth ofyour
business? (Percentage ofrespondents, N=38).
Minor Don't know/Not
Major Constraint Constraint Not a Constraint Sure
Demand 8 34 58 0
CWost of electrity 6 _6 _16 0
Weak electricity 55 26 18 0
Water quantity 0 8 92 0
Tax amount 8 32 61 0
Bureaucracy 3 8 76 13
Financig 50 16 24__ __ 11__ _
Inflation 21 53 24 3
Crime / Theft 16 39 45 0
Among the 71 percent of providers who did not use a financing source in the past year, the
most common response, from 37 percent of providers, was that they did not need a loan to maintain
their business. Fifteen percent had their loan rejected and another 15 percent said that interest rates
were very / too high; Very few or none blamed a lack of lenders, difficulty in repaying a loan, a
complicated approval process, or fear of being rejected.
Despite high inflation, not a single provider in the survey raised his or her prices in the last
year. However, 10 percent cited that the reason they did not raise prices in the past year was because
the price of electricity did not go up, suggesting a direct correlation between electricity prices and
water prices in SPSP operations. The main reason providers gave for not raising prices was that their
customer base was low-income / could not afford higher prices. This statement likely represents a
combination of providers, some not raising prices because they want to keep prices affordable for
their customers, and others just responding to market realities.
Although the typical non-revenue water rate was only 5 percent, we see those reporting
crime / threat as a "major constraint" also reporting the highest percentages of water loss, up to 22
percent. Those reporting crime / theft as a "minor constraint" report commensurately lower
percentages of water loss. Finally, all providers who said they had zero non-revenue water also said
that crime / theft was not a constraint, the opposite however, does not hold.
Bureaucracy, here meant to convey government or informal authorities' involvement in
ISNO operations, does not seem to be a constraint at all. The most frequent government involvement
in SPSP affairs is water quality monitoring. Over half of all providers, 63 percent, had their water
tested and checked by the Ministry of Health of the Government of Mozambique. Most have their
water tested twice per year and 16 percent of providers being monitored received warnings related to
their water quality. Providers usually respond immediately to these warnings to rectify the situation,
which often involves treating their water with chemicals or cleaning their water tanks. Among the
providers that were not being monitored, four self-tested their water, often sending samples to a lab
or testing it on site. The average cost per test is $16.77 and if providers want to test their water twice
per year it would cost them $33.50 - a somewhat hefty cost for providers to bear on their own.
Despite the "major" constraints, such as high electricity costs, weak electricity, lack of / high
cost of financing, mentioned by providers, 67 percent of them plan to expand in the next year. They
were also very optimistic about their prospects for survival in the near- to long-term. More than 70
percent of providers saw themselves operating up to 10 years from now, with 72 percent believing
they will be operating 5 years from now, and 84 percent believing they will be operating at the end of
2006. Close to one-third of providers believed or were not sure that they would be operating 1 or 5
years from now. Interestingly, 100 percent of those providers felt they would be taken over /
displaced by the lessee, AdM. In fact, even among those who did not feel that they would be taken
over / displaced by AdM in the next 5 years, 50 percent felt that it was possible or highly likely that
AdM would be providing water in their area within the next two years.
Table 4.19: How are you thinking of expanding
(Percentage ofISNOs responding, N= 38)?
Yes No
Plans to Expand 66 34
How do you plan to expand? (More than one response permitted, N=25)
Increase quandty of water supplied 16 -
Add meters to existng connections 4 -
Construct new small network system 60
Expand household connecdons 40 -
Table 4:20: Perceptions on business survival in the short-, medium- and long-term
(Percentage ofISNOs responding)
1 year from now 5years from now 10years from now
(N=38) (N=36) (N=31)
Believe that business
will be operating... 84 72 71
Chart 4.4: How likely do you think it is that, during the next two years, Aguas de Mo ambique will
begin to provide water in your service area? (Percentage ofSPSPs responding, N=28)
Not Sure
Don't know /
14%
Highly likely /Impossible
certain 36%
18%
Possible
32%
The 34 percent of providers who were not thinking of expanding gave a variety of reasons for
not wanting to. More providers said they were incapable of expanding (7 providers) than not having
a desire or interest in expanding (3 providers); the rest said they were not sure why they were not
thinking of expanding (3 providers). The three providers who said they had no desire gave the
following reasons: 1) "I cannot control when clients pay, my priority is to get more payments from
my current clients"; 2) 1 am satisfied with my current level of business"; and 3) "Too many providers
exist in the area and my expansion is not necessary".
An ISNO's desire to expand or actual business expansion can potentially be influenced by the
lessee's decision to expand its operation(s). To see how AdM's expansion might affect Maputo's
ISNOs' investment decisions we looked at expansion plans, planned spending on fixed assets, and the
desire for financing in the upcoming year by whether a provider felt they would not be operating in
the next 1 to 5 years because of AdM expansion. We found that although the percentage of
providers wanting to expand and the level of planned fixed asset spending were both lower for those
providers that signaled potential AdM takeover / entry, these same providers were more likely to
want loans in the upcoming year.
Although planned spending is lower for providers who signaled concerns over AdM, it is not
low in absolute terms. This pattern could be signaling an investment phenomenon among Maputo's
ISNOs. Providers who are seriously concerned about AdM's arrival are preparing to expand and
spend a significant amount of money in the upcoming year, but not on their existing system. Many
are planning to invest in an entirely new system in an entirely new area further from the city center
and AdM's network. Thus, although a portion of providers may be pulling back their expansion and
investment plans for fear of displacement in the near future, another portion is planning to spend
more than it would to simply expand its existing system in order to create a whole new business
opportunity.
Table 4.21: Planned expansion and spending in the upcoming year
Amount
Percentage Planned spending on desired
Planning to fixed assets in 2006 Wants loan (Mean /
N Expand (Mean / Median) in 2006 Median
ISNOs who feel they
will still be in business $10,630
10 years later 26 69 $4,409 / $1,578 65 / $9,345
ISNOs who feel their
current systems will be
displaced/taken over by $7,944 /
AdMin the next 5years 11 55 $2,670 / $1,038 73 $9,345
NB: None of the differences were found to be significant at the 95% confidence level
Irrespective of threat of displacement, providers felt that their operations were far better than
AdM with respect to quantity of water available per customer, water quality, water pressure, hours of
water supply, and customer service. The only metric they felt AdM is competitive on is price, with
an almost equal number of providers feeling that SPSP prices were "more favorable" and "less
favorable".
Table 4.22: How would you compare your business to that ofAdM's on the following aspects?
(Percentage ofproviders responding, N=29)
More favorable Equal Less Favorable Don't Know
Quantity of water available per customer 79 3 14 3
Water quality 62 14 7 17
Water pressure 45 24 28 3
Hours of water supply service 72 14 14 0
Quality of customer service 76 14 10 0
Price 31 14 28 28
4.11 COMPETITION AND COLLABORATION
We asked providers to rate what they felt the competition level was in their service area.
Seventy percent claimed that competition was "high" or "moderate" while 30 percent claimed that
they operated in an area of "low" competition or faced no competition at all. This disproportionate
split unfortunately does not bode well for robust statistical tests; it does however indicate that some
competition exists in the ISNO market. Qualitative research prior to the study indicated that
providers competed with each other on the basis of lower prices and tailored services in terms of
hours of water provision. This study confirms that research: among providers claiming to have at
least a "low" level of competition, a quarter said they compete with lower prices and a half said they
compete with better service.
Table 4.23: Selfreported responses to competition
(Percentage ofproviders responding, N=31)
Try to be the first
Do not try to Lower Better Test water's to connect HHs in
compete prices service quality the area
Responses to
competition 13 26 52 3 3
Competition between providers can, on occasion, become intense with conflicts arising over
customers and selling areas. Almost 20 percent of providers (5 out of 28 respondents) who have
heard of the SPSP association process in Maputo (Appendix A) would like the association to be
involved in resolving conflicts over selling areas; the only types of services more in demand are
micro-loans and technical assistance. Also, just over 20 percent of all respondents already collaborate
informally with nearby providers to decide on client bases and / or selling areas. In addition,
informal collaboration over price limits is the most frequently cited type of collaboration among all
providers.
Table 4.24: Do you informally collaborate regularly with other providers
in your area to (N=38)...
Provide
Determine Provide technical loans or Purchase goods Decide on
price information / micro- or services in client base or
limits assistance fnance bulk together selling area
Percent ofproviders
responding 55 45 3 13 21
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CHAPTER 5:
DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS: STRATEGIC SMALL SCALE
PRIVATE-SECTOR PARTICIPATION
5.1 SECTOR GOALS AND SMALL PRIVATE-SECTOR PROVIDERS
Portuguese colonial rule has left Maputo's infrastructure greatly disadvantaged. Biased
service provision throughout the 20th century resulted in a city that today has spatially segregated
water services distinguishable along racial lines. On the one side, you have a small, relatively well
networked cement city; on the other, you have an inadequately served peri-urban expanse where
Africans make do with an unreliable, expensive, and sometimes hazardous amalgam of water services.
Neither independence nor large scale private sector participation (PSP) was able to undo this
colonial legacy. A centralized, socialist government was unable, and sometimes unwilling, to extend
Maputo's water network. The 16 year civil war between 1976 and 1992 wrecked the economy and
prevented adequate, sustainable domestic or foreign investment in urban infrastructure. Rapidly
escalating poverty alarmed both the Mozambican government and international community, who
together, adopted a World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) driven structural
adjustment program. A strong component of this program was large scale PSP in state run
enterprises.
Mozambique's experience with structural adjustment has had mixed results. Although the
country's gross domestic product (GDP) has grown at over 7 percent per year over the last 5 years,
largely due to aluminum smelting and exporting in the country's south, other sectors such as cashew
processing suffered and led to massive urban unemployment (Rodrik, 2002). Private sector
participation in the water sector is too nascent to be fully evaluated; the lease contract was signed in
1999 and devastating floods in 2000 pushed back coverage and service improvement plans until late
2001. However, evidence from the last 4 years indicates that the public investment agency, FIPAG,
and private operator, Aguas de Mogambique (AdM), are unable to keep up with Maputo's population
growth and demand for services. Currently over 60 percent of Maputo does not have direct access
(private connections or standpipe access) to the water network.
The existing situation is in direct conflict with Maputo's water sector goals today. As
Mozambique heads into the 21st century a commitment to its own development and international
standards, as embodied in the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), compel it to provide a
benchmark level of water service. Sector goals include universal coverage with a safe, reliable, and
adequate level of service that is financially, environmentally, and technically sustainable. The 2006
Draft National Water Resources Management Strategy (NWRMS), as determined by the Ministry of
Housing and Public Works (MOHP), has four main urban sector objectives 2: 1) Satisfy the MDGs by
achieving 70 coverage for water supply and sanitation in urban areas; 2) in the long term, achieve full
coverage in urban and peri-urban areas; 3) increase system efficiency through adequate management
programs and financial management; and 4) assure long-run system sustainability (DNA, 2006). In
addition to the above objectives, the Policy also calls for satisfying the basic water needs of the
population, with specific focus on the poor, and the establishment of urban protection zones to
prevent aquifer contamination.
In aiming for the sector's goals of universal coverage; safe, reliable, and affordable service; and
system sustainability in water supply, Maputo's small private-sector providers (SPSP) must be
evaluated for how they contribute towards or impede these goals. Equipped with a better
understanding of SPSP costs, prices, and operating environments, we can evaluate the possible
planning options. Three broad categories of options are available to policy makers: 1) actively work
to reduce or eliminate SPSP operations in favor of AdM expansion, 2) continue to adopt a laissez faire
attitude toward SPSPs while focusing policy development and resources on improvement of AdM,
and 3) implement business support services and regulation to make SPSP services safer, more reliable,
and more efficient. The NWRMS does mention SPSPs. It calls for the implementation of a SPSP
licensing, regulation, and support strategy to maximize positive benefits to SPSP consumers and avoid
public health risks. The evidence in this report corroborates the NWRMS - SPSPs should be viewed
as an integral part of Maputo's water delivery system, not as a 'problem' for, Maputo's W&S planning
and policy despite their often negative portrayal in the literature. Their operations can be made more
efficient, affordable, and environmentally sustainable with strategic policy and small business
interventions.
5.2 INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES
There are five main functions for successful modern water delivery: policy making,
regulation, asset ownership, corporate oversight, and service provision. Although asset ownership,
corporate ownership, and service provision can be public, private, or a combination of the two,
policymaking and regulation are always the public sector's purview (Pizarro, 2006). In Mozambique,
32 The NWRMS is currently a draft and could very possibly change in the near future. It should be read more as a
direction policy making in Mozambique is headed rather than a definitive end that has been reached.
the MOHP is responsible for overseeing the sector and setting national policy. FIPAG is the state
agency responsible for all infrastructure investment. It is the primary institution responsible for
coverage expansion. The private operator, currently AdM, is responsible for providing a safe,
reliable, and financially sustainable service while maintaining FIPAG's facilities. CRA, an
independent public agency, is responsible for ensuring affordability and, together with the Ministry
of Health (MOH), the quality of water delivered to customers.
FIPAG's specific responsibilities include: 1) investment and financial management for
rehabilitation and expansion of water supply assets; 2) maximizing efficiency and return on existing
assets; and 3) contract management, monitoring, and enforcement of the contractual obligations of
the private operator (FIPAG, 2004). As regulator, CRA's specific responsibilities include: 1)
evaluating and approving the customer tariff charges as proposed by FIPAG; 2) making
recommendations regarding the quality of service and investment programs; 3) mediation between
FIPAG and the private operator; and 4) conducting reviews of overall customer tariff levels and their
components including raw water, the operator's rate, and the meter rental fee33 (FIPAG, 2004).
All institutional actors are focused on improving coverage, service levels, and affordability for
peri-urban residents while protecting water quality and the environment. However, FIPAG and
AdM are primarily concerned with coverage expansion and cost-recovery while CRA is primarily
concerned with environmental protection and reaching the poor. This is likely to lead to a
disconnect between the institutions around details of how the poor are served and environmental
protection is handled.
Both FIPAG and CRA rely on AdM for part of its revenue. AdM pays FIPAG and CRA
$35,000 and $US 33,000 per month to lease the system, respectively. FIPAG has more of an incentive
to ensure AdM's financial sustainability because it would be responsible for covering operating costs
that AdM is unable to meet; if AdM meets the terms of its contract but still suffers a loss, FIPAG
ensure that shareholders do not incur a loss. Because CRA has limited income, it too is vested in
AdM's success, but less so than FIPAG. Financially, it would be in both institutions' interests for the
33 CRA's other duties include 5) the establishment of focus groups of water users and municipalities to evaluate the
quality of service and network expansion programs; 6) carrying out customer service audits; and 7) periodic and
interim reviews.
private operator - small or large - to be profitable 4. At the same time, it is theoretically better for
customers to pay the costs of regulation via CRA than risk the local or national government strong-
arming the regulatory agency if the government were to bear the regulatory burden.
5.3 FIPAG AND ADM UNABLE TO MEET GOALS ALONE
Currently AdM is serving approximately 504,530 peri-urban residents while Maputo's
independent small network operators are serving between 147,000 and 200,000 residents. These
figures suggest that AdM is serving a much larger market than the ISNOs. However, the market is
highly segmented with respect to the distance from the network. Some peri-urban bairros closer to
the city can be described as inner bairros, or "suburbios", and in these areas AdM is the dominant
supplier, providing 47 percent of the water with a direct service; ISNOs only provide 20 percent of
the water. However, in the outer bairros, AdM is only able to provide 12 percent of the water with
groundwater delivered through standpipes because no network exists. Maputo's ISNOs, on the other
hand, provide 66 percent of outer bairro residents with groundwater services, often with a private
connection. Residents not using either of these services obtain water from neighbors with an AdM
connection or from a variety of wells and natural sources.
Table 5.1: Water provision in inner and outer bairros by provider type
Aguas de Mogambiqge Maputo's ISNOs
Bairw type Inner Outer Inner Outer
Customezy served 504,530 145,000 - 200,000
Standpipes and HH Standpipes and Standpipes and
Stavr cnd is Standpipes household household
Deliverymethod connections connections
River water via the Groundwater Groundwater Groundwater
Waersource network
Standpipes: 4 to 14 Standpipes: 14 hours; Standpipes: 14
hours; Standpipes: 4 to HH connections: 24 hours;
HH connections: 14 hours HH connections: 24
Service level 14 hours hours hours
3 FIPAG and CRA also have other sources of funding, primarily multilateral aid from agencies like the African
Development Bank.
If the government were to eliminate ISNOs, they would have to be able to serve at least an
additional 147,000 to 200,000 residents with either 14 hour standpipe service or 24 hour private
connections in the near future. Although current projects to increase coverage are underway,
including a new distribution center in peri-urban Maputo, the likelihood of AdM reaching most
current ISNO customers in the next 10 years, especially in the outer bairros, is low. Over the four
year period between 2002 and 2005, AdM was able to extend new service to an average of 31,688
persons per year. Given Maputo's urbanization rate of approximately 3 percent per year35, an
additional 47,300 people will live in peri-urban Maputo in 2006. That is a gap of 15,612 persons from
2006 alone and the gap will likely widen over time. FIPAG estimates that the Umbeluzi treatment
plant will be able to handle excess capacity by 2010 - the year peri-urban Maputo's new distribution
center can begin delivering water. Once the distribution center is in operation, coverage will expand
rapidly. Until then however, the coverage gap will grow by 92,680 people; in 2010 almost one
million Maputo residents will not have utility network access. Even once the distribution center is in
operation, it is not likely that AdM and FIPAG will be able to meet sector objectives alone.
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Figure 5.1: Growth ofMaputo's un -served residents
Source: Aguas de Mogambique commercial department data
s Estimates range from between 1.5 and 10 percent. This average of 3 percent is likely to capture the average growth
rate of peri-urban Maputo. Population growth numbers are calculated using only the peri-urban population figures,
not the entire city.
Aguas de Mogambique faces several challenges in addition to keeping up with population
growth. The unaccounted for water (UFW) level is worrying. Unaccounted for water averaged 61
percent between 2002 and 2004, exactly double the African utility average of 30.5 percent (IBNET,
2006). The company's puts most of the blame on illegal connections -50 percent of this UFW is lost
during the distribution phase. Another 40 percent is lost through transmission; most of the network
is more than 30 years old (Hydroconseil, 2005). Collections are also a problem, and something the
company's geographic information system is trying to address. Seventy percent of residential billed
water is collected and only 44 percent of standpipe billed water is collected. This could be because
clients see the billing system as disassociated from reality - only 14 percent of consumers had the
impression that they were being billed for real consumption (DNA, 2004).
Overstaffing, which is a common source of operational inefficiency in developing country
water and sanitation utilities, is not a problem in Maputo. With a staff of 625, AdM had a staff-
connection ratio of 7 to 1000 in 2004, which is well below the African average of 20 staff per 1000
connections (IBNET, 2006). Despite this good ratio, management of per-urban AdM standpipes has
been a persistent issue. Different management models, involving the community, private operators of
standpipes, and/or local authorities, have been experimented and adapted, but numerous
maintenance problems still remain (Thompson, 2005).
The lease contract ensures that AdM never suffers a loss so long as it complies with the terms
of its contract. Although there are incentives for good performance - profits above lease payments to
FIPAG and the regulator, CRA, are kept by AdM - there is also a subsidy mechanism built into the
contract. In quarters or months where the payment to FIPAG or CRA results in a net negative
account for AdM, that is, its net working ratio is larger than one, FIPAG will compensate AdM so
that it does not suffer a loss. In short, if AdM follows contract rules, often loosely defined, it will
never incur a financial loss. If AdM continues to face high UFW rates, illegal connections, collection
difficulties, and management problems it could lead to increased public spending.
Aguas de Mogambique and FIPAG's expected coverage gap and significant performance
issues, especially with respect to UFW, lead to outright admittance that the two cannot meet sector
goals alone. A number of projects are underway to help alleviate some of the sector's ills. However,
they will take at least 5 to 10 years to become fully beneficial and policy makers are aware that the
challenges are significant enough to warrant concern. FIPAG officials claim that in order to meet the
80 percent coverage goal for Maputo, FIPAG would have to double the existing infrastructure and it
is not capable of doing so alone, "SPSPs will have to be used". Recommendations from external
consultants also encourage capitalizing on the work SPSPs have already done and the infrastructure
they have built (Hydroconseil, 2005).
5.4 WHAT NOT TO Do: A LAISSEZ-FAIRE APPROACH
Mozambique is one of the world's poorest countries. A lack of financial and human resources
makes management, monitoring, or regulation a difficult task. Private sector enthusiasts point to
market discipline via competition as a way to indirectly regulate prices, water quality, and service.
Since ISNOs demonstrate entrepreneurialism, an ability to effectively respond to demand, and decent
service, adopting a laissez faire policy towards their operations presents an attractive option.
However, continued ISNO growth in an unregulated sector would help achieve certain sector goals,
particularly reliable service and financial and technical sustainability, but would fall short on service
to the poorest residents and ensuring water quality. If a large portion of the peri-urban population
continues to go un-served it will pose a substantial health risk for everyone. Illnesses plaguing the
city's poor can actually migrate across geographic boundaries, potentially creating a public health
calamity for the whole city.
Maputo's per-urban water situation looks very much like most of Europe's water delivery
during the 1700s. The establishment of European water systems was largely based on private
initiatives (Juuti, 2005). In England small, private, unauthorized companies began supplying piped
water to households. In the city of Leeds wealthy households had piped water supply while the
remaining residents continued to rely on wells, boreholes, water carriers, and the River Aire (De la
Motte, 2005).
Figure 5.2: Water haulers in Pest-Buda, Hungary in the 1800s.
Source: Water, Time, and European Cities (Juuti, 2005).
Although many European governments did get involved in water supply as the 1800s approached, the
private sector continued to play a major role; In Italy private sector participation was prevalent until
full municipalization began in 1900 (Juuti, 2005). Prior to government control of local water systems,
Europe, particularly England, allowed private companies to operate under parliamentary decree and a
regulatory regime. This was a response to increasing industrial water needs and a failed laissez-faire
approach. The private sector was not meeting England's industrial water needs and public health
crises were fueled by widespread cholera outbreaks in the 1830s and 1840s. Government
intervention was needed (Hassan, 1985). Although municipalization was better than the amalgam of
private services, if history is any lesson, overall responsibility and safeguarding of supplies through
strategic policy interventions was a necessary interim step for overall sector success.
5.5 ISNOs' CONTRIBUTIONS TO SECTOR GOALS IN AN ILLEGAL ENVIRONMENT
Despite ISNO operations' illegality, they have been positively contributing to sector goals
such as increased coverage, safe and reliable service, and financial and technical sustainability.
However, their operations are not perfect. Namely, the nature of their business and operating
environment does not provide incentives for serving the poorest of the poor or for internalizing
environmental externalities. Still, there are significant costs associated with dismantling their
operations while there are significant benefits from strategic policy and business support
interventions. Dismantling current ISNO operations will leave many peri-urban residents much
worse off until the utility network can reach them, which is not for at least another 10- 15 years. On
the other hand, helping to increase ISNOs' productive efficiency and reduce their operating costs,
which would also provide incentives to meet sector standards, can lead to ISNOs positively
contributing to all sector goals. Although there are some challenges to providing ISNOs with support
and getting them to meet sector standards, they will come from political and institutional constraints
and not necessarily the providers themselves.
Currently, only a handful of providers have a groundwater extraction permit. Although the
municipality has control over what is deemed "urban land", it has to obey national laws, including
the 1991 Water Law that regulates the management and use of water resources. Technically,
groundwater is state property and its extraction requires a permit from the South Region Water
Administration (ARA-Sul). The reason only a handful of providers have this permit is two fold.
First, a fee is required for the license36 . Second, and the more dominant reason, is because
groundwater resources are poorly controlled and lack specific regulation. This is understandable
since the many peri-urban residents without network access must access water somehow and
groundwater is the most convenient and reliable source in the area; prohibiting groundwater
extraction outright would be equivalent to spurring a crisis or calamity.
An ISNO's more precarious act is selling water in AdM's lease area. According to contract
rules, AdM is the only operator legally authorized to sell water in Maputo. Although the lease area
does not cover every square kilometer of the city, it covers the majority of the most settled bairros.
There is a clause in the contract that allows FIPAG to authorize a third party seller in the lease area37.
FIPAG, however, has not yet authorized any ISNOs. Illegally operating in AdM's lease area is
grounds for ceasing ISNO operations. The other infringement - extracting groundwater - applies to
too many peri-urban residents and prohibition is likely to be viewed as illegitimate.
36 This is usually a one time payment made at the time of borehole drilling. The one provider in our sample who got
the permit paid US $114.
37 FIPAG can authorize a system or infrastructure to provide water supply to areas not already served by the existing
network. FIPAG has to 1) give AdM at least 30 days prior notice before deciding to do so; 2)consult the operator with
respect to the possible impact of the proposed authorization on raw water sources' protection from pollution and the
network's protection; 3) approve AdM's bulk water charge the third party's network use that AdM may levy if it
desires.
Although technically illegal, over the last 10 years Maputo's ISNOs have been able to reach
between 147,000 and 200,000 customers through 16,000 private connections and over 230 standpipes.
This is equivalent to at least 10 percent of all of Maputo's non-Cement city residents and 23 percent
of all Maputo residents served by AdM through private connections or standpipes. The response to
demand was rapid. The typical provider tripled his household connections over the lifetime of his
business (typically 5.5 years with an absolute increase of 39 connections). In addition, aside from the
main utility they are the only other source of household connections in Maputo. According to recent
studies, water supply is the number one public service priority (David, 2006; DNA, 2004) and a
private connection is the most desired service level (DNA, 2004; Hydroconseil, 2005) among peri-
urban households.
The Ministry of Health (MOH) ensures that the majority of ISNOs' water is safe to drink.
Currently the agency monitors 63 percent of interviewed providers' water at least twice a year 38.
Ideally 100 percent of providers would be monitored but this gap could simply be due to lag in
information sharing between FIPAG and the MOH. Among those ISNOs not being monitored, 11
percent monitor their own water to ensure safety for their customers. Thus, about three out of four
providers' distributed water is deemed potable. Informational interviews with households
demonstrated a high level of satisfaction with ISNO water among peri-urban residents in bairros
Hulene A and Hulene B.
ISNO services with respect to hours of supply, minimization of service interruptions, and
quantity supplied are very reliable. Maputo's ISNOs provide water a median of 24 hours a day and an
average supply time of 19 hours a day; over 50 percent of providers supply private connections with
water 24 hours a day. Standpipes furnish water all day long and only close at sundown. This seems
to be normal practice in Africa (Collignon, 2000). About 40 percent of providers interviewed had to
close for some period of time during 2005, but the break was only 4 days on average. Providers
showed concern for their service levels and they often felt great discomfort if they had to close
operations because of a pump failure or if electricity was insufficient and they could not replenish
water in their tanks. Service interruptions are not by choice and providers make every effort to
restart as soon as possible. The typical ISNO provides 80 liters per capita per day to a household
38 A report by Hydroconseil also recorded instances of SPSP water being monitored by MOH, but their evidence was
not quantified.
connection. Additionally, providers responded most positively to the category "Quality of customer
service" (response time to complaints and connection repairs) than any other when asked to rank
themselves in comparison to AdM.
ISNOs' overall financial sustainability is one of their strongest assets. They self-finance their
systems with their own capital and in some cases the capital of family and friends. Still, when
accounting for capital recovery at a rate of 12.5 percent of system value per year (payback period of 8
years), only 5 providers in our sample are at risk of financial collapse. This is because providers
recover recurrent costs well - the typical working ratio is .41 - and do so by maintaining low UFW
rates. They keep a typical UFW of 5 percent by preventing water theft and resale, using meters,
enforcing collection from the majority of customers through potential service disconnections, and
using locally appropriate infrastructure, such as malleable rubber pipes, to minimize water leakage.
Standpipe attendants ensure customers pay for their jerricans and water is not left running.
Providers strive for technical sustainability of their systems. Among those planning on
maintaining or expanding their current system, the average planned spending in 2006 is $1,290.
Maintenance usually involves repairing damaged pumps, fixing leaks in pipes or tanks, repairing
standpipes, or cleaning the insides of tanks. Expansion of existing systems involves increasing water
holding capacity (stronger pumps, larger tanks) and increasing the number of private connections.
5.6 ISNOs' OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES AND MARKET DISINCENTIVES
ISNOs ability to increase coverage and provide safe, reliable service in a financially and
technically sustainable manner is somewhat clouded by operational challenges and market
disincentives. The typical provider has difficulty always maintaining adequate pressure in his
customers' private connections. All providers, responding to market demand and striving to recover
operating costs without government assistance, target wealthy households, charge high connection
fees, and have water prices that exceed nationally and internationally recommended limits. No
provider has the incentive to limit the amount of water abstracted from the public aquifer; an ISNO
does not receive a price signal for the scarcity value of abstracted water. Also, no provider has the
incentive to limit the number of boreholes drilled; licenses are not required and those furnished are
illegitimate at formal administrative levels.
ISNOs exhibit less confidence is water pressure than other service measures. Pressure is
directly correlated with a water tank's capacity and height off the ground. Providers face three
financial challenges to creating greater pressure: 1) larger tanks are more costly; 2) building higher
elevated structures for tanks to sit on is costly because of materials and labor costs; and 3) pumping
water to greater heights requires stronger pumps and more electricity, both of which already account
for providers' high investment and recurrent costs. Unlike service quality, where 90 percent of
providers felt their service was on par with or better than AdM's, only 69 percent of providers felt
they were on par with or better with respect to water pressure. Providers openly admitted that their
customers' largest complaint was water pressure in private connections, standpipe pressure is fine.
Improving pressure is dependent on the cost of infrastructure and electricity, type of technology
employed, and providers' profits.
Despite strong, rapid growth ISNOs will only serve between 55 and 70 percent of Maputo's
peri-urban household market with private connections. According to willingness-to-pay studies, at
least 64 percent of the population would be willing to pay $84.00 to obtain a private connection
(DNA, 2004; Hydroconseil, 2005). This is above the median connection fee of $77.00 that ISNOs
charge. However, only 55 percent of peri-urban residents are willing to pay the ISNO median
monthly fee of $8.30 for 10 cubic meters of water (DNA, 2004). These are conservative estimates and
with financing packages for connection fees that about 50 percent of ISNOs provide, the percentage
of residents wanting to private connections will rise slightly. Still, this study estimates that no more
than 70 percent of households will want private connections from ISNOs at current median prices.
Two-thirds of those who cannot afford to connect to an ISNO network can purchase one
cubic meter for $1.04 at ISNO standpipes. Using current standpipe users' average consumption levels
of 26.5 lpcd, the average peri-urban standpipe dependent household spends $5.08 a month, or 5.5
percent of two minimum Mozambican monthly wages; the legal limit is 4 percent3 9. The remaining
third who cannot afford ISNO standpipes will have to rely on AdM standpipes, private and public
shallow wells, or neighbors' private connections. These sources are less safe and less reliable than
ISNO standpipes. ISNOs may decide to add standpipes to their systems to meet demand, but several
39 Note that this price would be very close to acceptable according to PAHO international standards of 5 percent of
monthly household income. Since a few providers offer a bulk discount to all users at standpipes, many families get
their monthly quantities at 3.6 instead of 5.5 percent of monthly household income.
cite low profits and large inconveniences as reasons for closing standpipes in the past. Providers find
standpipes inconvenient because they usually have to be located in front of their homes where the
borehole is to ensure proper management.
Families willing to pay for ISNO water are paying more than Mozambican and international
standards for monthly household water consumption. Mozambican policy states that no family
should spend more than 4 percent of two monthly minimum wages on household consumption per
month. International guidelines set by the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) state that no
household should have to pay more than 5 percent of its monthly income (Gomez-Lobo, 2001) on
consumption per month40 . Given ISNO median prices and these expenditure guidelines, the average
Maputo household would only be consuming 24 lpcd and 44 lpcd at these limits, respectively, lower
than WHO recommended consumption levels of 50 lpcd.
Table 5.2: Monthly fees, resulting consumption, and expenditure guidelines.
Monthly fee... Results in Lpcd
Actual Consumption level in Maputo: private connections $7.88 50
Actual Consumption level in Maputo: standpipes $5.11 26.5
PAHO recommended expenditure limit $6.95 44
Government of Mozambique's recommended limit $3.72 24
Despite this, peri-urban households exhibit strong demand for ISNO services. As long as demand
remains as high as it is now, there is little incentive for providers to drop prices in the future.
The regulatory agency expressed a number of reasons why ISNO operations can be
potentially harmful to the environment and consumers' health. Although most of Maputo has
plentiful groundwater, extensive abstraction can lead to rapid aquifer depletion and eventually saline
intrusion, rendering groundwater un-potable. By using and potentially harming a public resource,
groundwater, for private gain in the form of revenues from water sales, ISNOs are producing a
negative externality. Their current input costs do not reflect the full cost they impose on society. The
government thus far has not sent this price signal to providers. If ISNOs had to pay to extract
groundwater, only those who continue to find it profitable to abstract water will continue to do so.
40 Official statistics do put Maputo's income higher than anywhere else in the country but they fail to distinguish
which percent of the sample was from the cement city and the peri-urban areas. For that reason, the average national
urban household income is used in this report, which could be understating Maputo's purchasing power.
The lack of regulation around borehole construction leaves groundwater highly susceptible to
microbiological or nitrate contamination. The large number of latrines in use in peri-urban Maputo
causes pathogens and nitrates to seep into the soil, which, if not kept distant enough from a borewell,
can eventually reach the water source. Consuming pathogens can lead to diarrhea, cholera, or other
water-borne diseases. Consuming too many nitrates can lead to sickness and even death, especially
among young children. Although none of the above potential threats are currently a serious problem
for Maputo's ISNOs41 (David, 2006), AdM boreholes have experienced high contamination rates
(Hydroconseil, 2005). The regulatory agency believes increased ISNO drilling could reduce
groundwater quality in the near future. The negative externality from borehole contamination is very
high - a single contaminated ISNO borehole can spoil the entire aquifer - and hence so is the impetus
for cooperation - a spoiled aquifer detracts from every ISNO's commercial prospects.
SPSPs are burgeoning at an incredible rate. The illegality of SPSPs' operations does not seem
to be deterring their investment; the survey shows that projected investment levels among ISNOs for
2006 are high. The 15 ISNOs that said they planned on expanding by constructing a new small
network system plan on spending a total of $105,000 ($7000 each on average) on fixed assets in 2006.
From the survey results, we can safely expect at least 60 new borehole systems in Maputo in 200642.
If fifteen systems use $105,000, sixty new systems would use approximately $420,000 of infrastructure
investment. Expected investment in 2006 can then be considered to be 25 percent of total existing
investment (US $1.5 million). Given that it took ten to twelve years to build up the existing
infrastructure base, a 25 percent climb in one year, or at least a desired 25 percent climb,
demonstrates strong, rapid growth in the sector.
5.7 THE BENEFITS OF STRATEGIC POLICY AND BUSINESS SUPPORT INTERVENTIONS
41 Of the 22 providers who get their water checked, four did receive a written warning for water quality. I spoke
with two of the providers who reported getting warnings, one had to have his water depositories cleaned and the
other had to treat his water. Given these two requests, it does not seem that nitrates or salinity were cause for
concern.
42 These 15 ISNOs represent 40 percent of our entire sample. If we consider our sample statistically representative,
we could say that 40 percent of all ISNOs would like to expand next year by building a new small system network.
That would mean approximately 70 new systems in Maputo next year alone. Of course many of those planning to
build may eventually fail to do so, but we can safely expect 60 new systems next year alone.
ISNOs' rapid growth rate demands policymakers' attention and action. This action should
consist of strategic policy and business support interventions for ISNOs rather than their forced
removal. Focusing on ISNOs' shortcomings and actively dismantling their operations comes with
substantive transaction costs that would be counterproductive to sector goals. More valuable are
initiatives that capitalize on their ability to increase coverage, encourage their productive efficiency,
reduce their operating costs, and improve their service quality, "The problem which we face in
dealing with actions which have harmful effects is not simply one of restraining those responsible for
them. What has to be decided is whether the gain from preventing the harm is greater than the loss
which would be suffered elsewhere as a result of stopping the action which produces the harm"
(Coase, 1960). Engaging in supportive activities also creates scope for environmental regulation via
incentive measures and reciprocity agreements.
5.7.1 THE CHALLENGES AND COSTS OF FORCED ISNO REMOVAL
Eliminating the typical ISNO means forcing 442 peri-urban residents to fend for other, often
less desirable, water sources. Even if another source is provided for these residents, like an extension
of AdM's network, ceasing an ISNO operation would not be easy. Despite being illegal, many ISNOs
consider their operations to be a public service with unspoken legitimacy. This sentiment is likely a
result of institutional discordance and the utility's failure to serve peri-urban Maputo for so many
years. Some ISNOs are registered with their local districts and are given 'authority' to operate by
their district or bairro secretaries4 3; some, though not all of these providers know that this "license"
will not protect them from higher authorities such as the municipality or CRA. Yet, CRA has
allowed them to operate without interference since its inception in 1999. Two out of every three
providers in our sample report that they are having their water tested, almost all by the MOH. This
'legitimizes' ISNO operations further. Although water quality is being tested, there are no solid
regulatory mechanisms coming from CRA - ISNOs may perceive the regulatory agency to be
43 The variation in registration practices highlights the discontinuity between the official institutions that would
require registration - DNA, the municipality, or CRA - and local bairro and district governing authorities. Even
more puzzling is the registration variation within local districts and bairros; some providers are registered and some
are not within the same bairro. Bairros where ISNOs are registered include Hulene A, Hulene B, Khongolote,
Mahotas, Mavalane A, Mavalane, Ndlavela, Tsalala, and Zimpeto.
uninterested, especially when FIPAG is the agency actively trying to partner with them. The
informal, discordant institutional framework around ISNO operations could pose as a barrier to
forced closure.
ISNOs feel they have local support and are bolstered to continue serving their community.
Local political pressure to keep systems running should not be dismissed. When AdM attempted to
shut down standpipes because either managers were not presenting bills or the local committees were
not collecting them, they faced immediate local pressure to reopen them (Thompson, 2005); ISNOs'
private connections serve wealthier residents - including bairro chiefs and district secretaries - and
will likely result in superior pressure. Some of this sentiment is reflected in ISNOs' low opinion of
AdM; very few consider AdM to be superior to them on any metric of service or water quality.
There is also the financial cost of compensating ISNOs for their existing assets. There is a
debate within the sector on whether ISNOs should be compensated for their existing investment.
Some say that ISNOs have profited for too long from State water resources and deserve no
compensation while ISNOs feel that they have been providing a public service when the government
could not. Realistically, given that some SPSPs have political weight and most have been long
entrenched in their respective communities, some compensation will likely have to be provided. The
current replacement value of water supply infrastructure managed by ISNOs throughout Maputo is
roughly $1.5 million" in 2005 figures, equivalent to 17 state-of-the-art small systems that could
extend a utility's network and serve 85,000 people through 2,550 private connections and 119
standpipes (Hydroconseil, 2005).
5.7.2 INCREASING ISNOs' PRODUCTIVE EFFICIENCY
There is scope to increase productive efficiency among ISNOs. Whereas the typical ISNO is
financially sustainable, a marked decline in unit production cost was documented once a provider
exceeds 75 private connections or 1000 cubic meters of water sales per month. Prices between
44 The current total system value of our sampled providers equals $448,000 and our sample represents between 20 and
25 percent of all Maputo's operators. Thus, we multiplied the current system value by 5.53 and depreciated this
figure by 9.5 percent (IMF, 2006) over five years, the average ISNO years in operation, to arrive at the current figure.
The total, however, is closer to US $2 million if we consider materials for private connections contributed by
households and repairs made by ISNOs on their systems.
providers who have more than 75 connections and those that have 75 connections or less are very
similar, but profits are not. Providers with more connections have considerably higher profits as a
percentage of revenues. Although the median cost per cubic meter is very similar between the two
cohorts, there is a ten cent difference in our sample between their average cost per cubic meter.
Table 5.3: Key financial indicators for smaller ISNOs versus larger ISNOs as defined
by number of household connections.
Smaller ISNOs Larger ISNOs
ISNO defined by number of
household connections
(Larger > 75) N Median Mean N Median Mean
Selfreported start-up costs 20 $11,243 $12,924 9 14,665 18,128
Working Ratio 27 0.47 0.56 11 0.36 0.32
Net monthly profits as
percentage of total revenues 23 12% 5% 9 55% 55%
Costper cubic meter 24 $0.28 $0.38 11 $0.26 $0.28
Price per cubic meter 18 $0.83 $0.90 8 $0.83 $0.87
Fixed monthly water fee 14 $10.38 $9.94 6 $8.31 $8.65
The gains from scale are more pronounced when looking at providers defined by their monthly
volume sales. Again, prices are similar between the two cohorts. However, not surprisingly, when
comparing with sales volume we see that gains from increased volume sales result in very large cost
per cubic meter reductions.
Table 5.4: Key financial indicators for smaller ISNOs versus larger ISNOs as defined
by cubic meters of water sold per month.
Smaller ISNOs Larger ISNOs
ISNO defined by cubic
meters sold per month
(Larger > 1000) N Median Mean N Median Mean
Selfreported start-up costs 19 11,281 $12,828 8 $15,882 $19,502
Working Ratio 22 0.46 0.55 13 0.36 0.40
Net monthly profits as
percentage of total revenues 22 24% 7% 9 47% 45%
Costper cubic meter 22 $0.31 $0.42 13 $0.13 $0.22
Price per cubic meter 15 $0.83 $0.92 11 $0.83 $0.86
Fixed monthly water fee 8 $10.38 $9.86 9 $8.31 $9.23
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Although the differences between larger and smaller cohorts as defined by the cutoffs above are most
pronounced, any increase in sales volume reduces costs (Chapter 4, figure 4.1) and increases profits45.
Prices between the two cohorts in our sample are very similar, with larger providers actually
consistently demonstrating slightly lower prices46 . Thus, profits are derived from scale and cost
savings. There are three principal ways policymakers can encourage larger ISNOs and in the process
improve sector efficiency. First, the government can encourage larger providers to buy out smaller
ones. Increasing access to capital from banks like Novo Banco, which have more funds available than
micro-credit organizations like Socremo, would be most appropriate. Second, it can support robust
small SPSPs who are looking to grow larger and expand their customer base. Third, it can regulate
prices. A price cap would retain only the most financially sustainable providers, which happen to be
the larger, more cost efficient ones. Small providers would be unable to internalize this regulatory
cost47 . Larger providers could internalize this cost and survive in the short term. In the medium term
they would take over their neighboring smaller providers' market share.
5.7.3 INCREASING COVERAGE, REDUCING COSTS, AND IMPROVING SERVICE VIA UNIVERSAL METERING
There is also scope to reduce ISNO costs and improve ISNO service quality. One of the
simplest and most effective ways to simultaneously reduce household expenditure on water, increase
coverage, and reduce an ISNO's labor costs is to encourage wider, preferably universal, meter use
among ISNOs. Metered ISNO customers pay 20 percent less than flat fee customers for 10 cubic
meters of water; if a household consumes less it saves even more. A combination of misconceptions
around water usage and costs creates this discrepancy. Providers assume large families benefit from a
flat fee so they can consume copious amounts of water when in reality few Maputo households
45 A constant elasticity function demonstrates that a 1 percent increase in sales volume increases net profits by I
percent. Although gross profits are high (the largest providers make gross profits as high as $3000 a month) net
profits are much more muted because of capital recovery. The typical provider earns only earns 60 percent of the
average urban household income from his water sales. Since our sample shows strong positive correlations between
sales volume and net profits, in the long term, larger providers will have the capital to further expand their existing or
build new systems.
46 Providers that are defined as larger according to monthly sales volume also have lower private connection fees ($65
versus $80).
47 The typical provider's break even price, where the working ratio = 1, not taking into account capital recovery is
$0.56 (13,500 MT) for a cubic meter with a monthly fee of $5.61 (135,000 MT) and a jerrican price of $0.01 (250 MT).
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consume more than 10 cubic meters a month. Households avoid paying the up-front meter cost of 17
dollars, perhaps as a savings measure, but end up typically paying $25 dollars extra a year for a flat
fee. Even with meters, families can safely consume 12.5 cubic meters a month at the current median
flat fee. Field research showed that at least the majority of providers are not aggressively pushing the
flat fee. Although 1 in 4 providers in our sample used only a flat fee, interviews showed that the
remaining providers that use a combination of the two tariffs often decide to use a meter based on the
customer's preference.
ISNOs strongly monitor resale of their water among flat fee customers but are much more
relaxed with respect to metered customers. Customers with flat fees who resell water often have
their connection cut. Providers are less concerned if metered customers resell because resold water is
still being accounted for. Also, meters are located at providers' homes and cannot be tampered with.
Thus, if all connections are metered, household resale could become a widespread practice.
Household resale presents benefits to all parties involved. Customers with private
connections pay 400 Mozambican Metical (MT) for 20 liters of water, or one jerrican. Many poorer
households currently fetch water from provider standpipes at 500 MT per jerrican. Therefore, if
households with private connections resell to their neighbors for 500 MT a jerrican, they make a 20
percent profit (the difference between 500 MT and 400 MT) while the neighbor avoids having to
make multiple trips to the standpipe. If the practice becomes widespread it could out-compete
standpipes. The savings to the ISNO will depend on the monthly salaries he pays his standpipe
operators48.
Increasing the number of meters in ISNO operations can be done in a number of ways. It
would likely be more affordable for customers if providers either: 1) bought meters for their
customers and charged them modest monthly meter fee; or 2) allowed customers to pay the meter
cost in installments at about $1.60 a month for 12 months. The public sector can help by educating
ISNOs on the benefits meters bestow on their operations, such as lower non-revenue water49 , and on
48 The most costly form of labor - full-time paid labor - is used to manage standpipes. The typical provider pays $58
a month in salaries to regular employees (full and part time). The typical provider will also lose $32 a month in sales
at standpipes from household resale 48. As long as an ISNO's labor costs are higher than his loss from household resale
he will welcome the cost savings. Providers using free familial labor, however, might find household resale less
beneficial and may dissuade their customers from practicing it.
49 Providers in our sample that used meters self-reported lower non-revenue water rates than providers that did not.
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their customers, such as lower volumetric fees. Also, the government could offer micro-credit to
providers or households to purchase meters at the time of connection. Finally, the government could
directly subsidize the cost of meters for providers or households like the city of Jakarta, Indonesia did,
as a pro-poor measure to increase coverage (Crane, 1994).
If household resale does not out-compete standpipes there are still ways the government can
help reduce expensive full-time labor costs or help providers free up their family members' time.
Labor costs account for a quarter of all monthly costs. It appears that a large opportunity cost to
operators is driving the use of full-time labor. Operators have other income generating activities that
they would be reluctant to give up to save on labor expenses (i.e. monitor standpipes themselves);
labor expenses are a fraction of what some providers earn from other income sources. However,
there may be room to use coin-operated standpipes. In Uganda, a company called Kalebu limited has
invented coin operated standpipes that deliver a fixed quantity of water to customers50. This would
pose a further investment cost but might save money in the long run. Aguas de Mogambique has a
similar type of "pre-paid" technology that it tried to employ with its peri-urban standpipes in 2001
but the project failed because of institutional disinterest and unaccountable community management
systems (Thompson, 2005). There might be room for an agreement whereby ISNOs purchase this
technology from AdM, providing both parties with an incentive - AdM makes a profit on its
technology and ISNOs save on recurrent labor costs.
5.7.4 LINKAGES BETWEEN THE ELECTRICITY AND WATER SECTORS: THE BURDEN OF BROKEN PUMPS
Policy reform, market development and/or technology innovation with respect to water
pumps could substantially lower costs, further improve service reliability, and increase pressure.
Currently pumps are made in South Africa and bought in Mbabane, Swaziland or Johannesburg,
South Africa at a cost of $465 or $620, depending on the pump's power level. There are only a
handful of sellers in Maputo and pumps come in two types: electrical submersible and subversive.
According to one seller, custom duties equal 60 percent of the pump cost. Thus, a pump costing $465
in Johannesburg will cost a Mozambican buyer $744. This pump sells to ISNOs for $1,038. There
so One problem with this is the lowest monetary denomination in Mozambique, the 500 MT coin, is higher than
what the average jerrican price should be. One option would be to provide two jerricans worth of water for every
500 MT coin, but that could pose problems for filling and carrying.
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must be other associated costs because although this amounts to a 40 percent profit, the seller who
gave this information stopped selling pumps in December 2005. He stated unreasonably high prices
in South Africa, very high customs duties, and cumbersome bureaucracy as reasons for exiting the
business - it was no longer profitable enough to warrant his time and effort. Reducing customs duties
and bureaucratic procedures would significantly reduce pump prices and increase competition in
pump sales. If pump salespersons continue to decline there will likely be longer or more ISNO
service outages and perhaps an increase in water prices.
Peri-urban electricity and water are strongly linked - improving electricity will improve
water supply. Electricity is both expensive and unreliable; currents fluctuate frequently. ISNOs'
service interruptions are the direct cause of either electricity outages or current fluctuations that
damage the pump's motor. Damaged motors prevent providers from bringing water up to their
storage tanks. This interaction between electricity and pump malfunctioning is important for both
lowering costs and improving service levels.
Pump maintenance, repair, and replacement is not necessary every month, but some
providers have to replace this costly infrastructure almost annually; the typical pump costs US $1,558
and is a significant part of total system cost. For those unfortunate providers who do replace pumps,
it can become their highest cost per cubic meter, trumping what they pay for electricity that year. If
an ISNO only has to repair his pump, it will cost him anywhere between $85 and $125 per job.
Repair and replacement is a frequent occurrence for a few providers in our sample and field research
indicated that it was more of a problem in the outer bairros. Also, the pumps ISNOs are currently
relying on are of inferior quality and are unable to prevent damage from electricity fluctuations.
There are four types of water pumps: water, electric, fuel, and hand driven. Water pumps, or
hydraulic ram pumps are not ideal for the Maputo ISNOs because they focus on delivering smaller
quantities of water to modest heights; providers' tanks are too high for this pump type. There is also a
lot of wasted water. Electric run motorized pumps are ideal in a setting where a large quantity of
water needs to be efficiently pumped to great heights. Electric pumps' usage is cautioned against in
areas with poor reliability of electricity and/or a low level of skills for maintenance and repair
(Skinner, 2003). Unfortunately, there is little redress - fuel driven pumps might malfunction as
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often, perhaps even more, than electric pumps. Also, the cost of fuel is very high 1. The remaining
alternative is the borehole hand pump. This is not a realistic strategy for large providerss2. However,
small providers for whom electricity is a substantial portion of monthly costs and borehole depth is
permissible at 45 meters might be able to save money by hiring someone to pump water for jerrican
customers and / or fill a 5000 liter tank overnight for private connections.
Larger providers will have to continue relying on motor driven pumps. The government
should reduce or eliminate tariffs on pumps used by ISNOs. Better yet, it could help foster a domestic
pump manufacturing industry. One support option would be to increase micro-credit to help with
repair and replacement. Another option is for the government to acquire more powerful pump
motors with circuit breakers and subsidize the cost for ISNOs. Finally, the government could supply
or finance generators and reduce a pump's reliance on the electricity grid. This could reduce outages
from broken pump motors. If the government cannot buy every provider a generator - the
generators used by providers in our survey cost on average $1,125 - it should at least provide a
generator leasing service with rapid deployment that could reduce service interruptions due to
electricity outages. However, an added benefit to ISNOs owning generators is the possibility of
increased electricity to peri-urban households. It is telling that three out of four peri-urban
households do not have electricity (David, 2006). This may be due to low monthly income, but lack
of coverage - similar to the W&S infrastructure history - must also play a role. If a generator is used
for supplying electricity service to households that lack access to the grid, it could present revenue
generating activities for SPSPs like it did in Vietnam and distribute water supply costs 5 3 (Pollard,
2005).
Lowering SPSP costs may require monitoring. Some academics suggest that prices may
respond more to cost increases than decreases, that is, if input costs go up price will respond more
commensurately than it would if input costs decreased (Kuran, 1986). This becomes more important
in the ISNO market, where among our sample it seemed as if though prices were determined after
si One liter of diesel fuel is US $1.00 in Maputo which means that the typical provider would have to spend US $20-
$25 on fuel a day, enormously more than the US $3.00 a day he or she spends on electricity now, to sell the same
amount of water.
52 The manpower required to raise water with a manual pump is significants2. A new pump in Nicaragua requires 1
minute to lift 8 liters of water (Lifewater, 2006)
53 It is not recommended that a generator be used to regularly provide electricity for an electrical pump. The costs to
operate the generator would be greater than the cost to operate a fuel driven water pump (Lifewater, 2006).
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informal collaboration between providers. Some providers cited that the reason they did not raise
prices in the last year was because they had not consulted their colleagues first. There might be
strong price determinants in Maputo beyond input costs.
The public sector is often called upon to improve financing for private sector entrepreneurs.
In Africa, entrepreneurs' access to credit is a particularly pervasive problem (Mehta, 2003). In
Maputo most ISNOs would use a loan to build a new small water network. This does not mean,
however, that providers do not use loans for other purposes. Almost a quarter of all providers
interviewed in Maputo did take out a loan in the last year to cover business related expenses and most
paid them off in less than a year. Therefore, if credit is provided, the government must consider its
regulatory capacity to limit new borehole sinking. If regulatory capacities are absent, policy makers
might want to cap the amount of credit available at significantly less than the cost to start a small
system. This way, those looking to maintain current systems can still access some form of capital and
move towards technical sustainability; maintenance loans often need not exceed US $2,000. This
strategy, however, will limit larger providers from buying out smaller ones, which should be
encouraged. In the end, the public sector may want to offer credit directly to providers with
conditions attached.
Interestingly, the small-scale food processing sector in Mozambique faces constraints similar
to the peri-urban water sector. A study surveying 23 companies in the food processing sector found
that electricity was a major constraint. In Maputo and the rest of southern Mozambique constant
power cuts and current fluctuations created problems. Lack of financing was mentioned as a barrier
to purchasing essential raw materials, which disrupted food production, as did the breakdown of
equipment and unavailability of spare parts (Cardoso, 2000). These three constraints - weak or
unpredictable electricity, lack of financing, and unreliable parts - could plague small industry in
southern Mozambique in general. The government might address these problems more broadly as a
strategy to bolster small-scale enterprises in Maputo province. They are a significant source of
employment in Africa with a third of new entrants in the labor force finding work in small
enterprises. The number of people employed in African small enterprises grows as these businesses
grown in scale and number (Mead, 1998).
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5.7.5 TAXATION AND REGULATION CAN HELP ENSURE A SAFE PERI-URBAN WATER SUPPLY
The business support interventions described above will harness a great deal of goodwill from
ISNOs who stand ready to work with the government. Not only will water supply become cheaper,
improved relations between the government and providers will increase the scope for improved
environmental regulation. ISNOs should not be exempt from standards that will ensure a safe service
level. By waiving regulations informal entrepreneurs pay no costs and politicians increase political
support. However, social welfare is reduced because the firms are discouraged from meeting
regulatory standards they would have been willing or able to absent political support, "Focusing on
the difficulties small and informal firms face in meeting the costs of environmental standards distracts
our attention from pursuing opportunities for firms to, indeed, rise to the occasion and meet these
standards, rather than be exempt from them.. .there are many cases in which small firms have
actually met those costs and, contrary to the burden-relieving scenario, have been better off for it"
(Tendler, 2002).
Hydrological assessments cite risk for saline intrusion into Maputo's groundwater sources if
the aquifer is over-abstracted (Hydroconseil, 2005). Because Maputo's groundwater is protected for
the benefit of all Mozambicans, ISNOs should pay a price for capitalizing on it. Pigovian taxes54 are
the appropriate way to avoid saline intrusion because the alternative, regulation, is viewed as having
a higher cost to society. Pigovian taxes raise revenue while with direct regulation an ISNO has no
incentive to abstract any less than what is allowable (Mankiw, 2001). The exact tax necessary will
vary depending on the ISNO's operating area, Maputo's groundwater replenishment rate, and the
sector's household water consumption targets.
The existing ad-hoc licensing scheme should be expanded and formalized to serve as a means
to regulate new provider entry. Indiscriminant borehole sinking can lead to groundwater
contamination. Contamination is a very serious threat because a single contaminated borehole can
potentially damage an entire aquifer, destabilizing numerous ISNOs and endangering thousands of
residents. The more boreholes that are sunk the greater the probability of contamination. For these
reasons taxation is not adequate. A combination of government oversight and fees must be used to
ensure that proper site selection takes place and indiscriminant drilling does not occur. The
54 A Pigovian tax is a tax levied to correct the negative externality of an activity.
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commercial license fee can vary to serve as an instrument of distortion - bairros with higher license
fees will attract fewer ISNOs. ISNOs should be prohibited from drilling without a commercial license
and appropriately punished if they choose to do otherwise. Regardless, for the license to be effective
it must cost more than the current rate of 2 percent of an ISNO's monthly profit.
If regulation of all ISNOs proves too burdensome or costly, an alternative might be to regulate
the drilling company. One such popular Mozambican company, GEOMOC, does surveying and
borehole drilling for a number of private individuals in peri-urban Maputo. Restricting its activities
is one route the government might want to take to reduce the transaction costs associated with
regulating numerous ISNOs. The feasibility, costs, and benefits of this type of regulation, however, is
beyond the scope of this study.
Both Pigovian taxes and licensing fees create productive efficiency in the market and raise
revenue for the sector. For the smallest ISNOs, implementing a tax or requiring a license would put
their businesses in financial jeopardy. Larger providers, however, can absorb such costs, particularly
if the efficiency gain and cost-savings strategies described above are provided. This would result in
larger providers dominating the market through eventual acquisition of smaller providers' previous
market share.
A market share agglomeration among current large providers should occur only in
conjunction with the government's ability to monitor or regulate prices if necessary. A large market
dominated by a few large providers would create an oligopoly situation where prices could be agreed
upon and customers would have fewer options to switch providers. There was some evidence during
informal conversations that currently prices did respond to competition. Two cases in one
neighborhood showed that when one provider changed his or her price structures, several other
providers followed. In one case a provider began to offer 3 jerricans for $0.04 instead of 2 at his
standpipe and neighboring providers with standpipes followed. In another case, one provider
complained that a nearby resident opened up a borehole and began offering water to private
connections at fixed monthly prices lower than hers - she had to lower her monthly fees to keep
pace. Because networks are currently small (median number of private connections equals 50) there
is competition at a network's edge; there were accounts of a couple of households switching private
connection service to a new ISNO. Opportunities for switching will diminish along with the number
of ISNOs.
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Fees collected from both taxes and licenses could contribute towards water resource
management efforts and /or ensuring supply for the poorest families that cannot access improved
sources with their own financial means. Historically, one of the greatest determinants of improved
public health was not only improved water and sanitation but education around hygiene (Juuti,
2005). Hygiene education programs as well as borehole protection5 could both be feasibly financed
through tax and license revenues. Private connections and meters could be subsidized for the poorest
families.
An alternative to groundwater regulation is to encourage or require ISNOs to transition to
AdM supplied water. This will be hard to achieve via regulation unless similar restrictions are also
placed on households. This will largely depend on the political challenges cited earlier and relations
between and water administration, ARA-Sul, and FIPAG. If ARA-Sul has no formal mandate to
cooperate with FIPAG or AdM, a situation similar to Jakarta, Indonesia could result where attempts
to limit access to private boreholes were unsuccessful (Bakker, 2005). It will also be costly to
purchase infrastructure for SPSPs. A modern small system that connects to a larger utility's network
serving 5000 people can cost $88,000 (Hydroconseil, 2005). There is also the compensation cost to a
provider, which if provided, would typically cost $6,500 per system (serving 442 people).
5.8 POLITICS, NOT PROVIDERS, WILL POSE CHALLENGES TO INSTITUTIONAL ACTION
Neo-classical economists believe private sector actors dislike taxation because it distorts
behavior by reducing incentives for investment. Scholars of the informal economy believe that
informal entrepreneurs are by definition those that avoid formal taxation, regulation, and licensing
(Portes, 1995). Some firms choose their optimal degree of participation in formal institutions because
enforcement is lax (Maloney, 2004). None of these is the case with Maputo's ISNOs. Field research
showed that ISNOs, similar to a case of Peruvian street vendors (De Soto, 1989), were highly willing
to: 1) be part of a formalized licensing system; 2) adhere to government regulations; and 3) pay taxes.
Although enthusiasm for paying taxes was lower than being licensed or following rules, only 2
providers out of the 15 interviewed did not want to pay taxes. Providers felt being formalized and
having a license would confer several benefits. They would like to be able to operate outside their
ss A borehole that has well protected walls and is fenced in has a lower probability of being contaminated.
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current bairro, obtain credit more easily, and have greater 'legitimacy' and 'recognition' in the eyes of
formal institutions. In fact, one ISNO in our sample got a license to drill his borehole because "all
public services must have legal backing". The challenges to strategic policy and regulatory
interventions will not come from the providers but existing political and institutional challenges in
Maputo that could affect any water provider, private or public.
Peri-urban Maputo operates in a political sphere very different from its cement neighbor.
Despite peri-urban areas' inclusion in the administrative structure, they went unrepresented in
political decisions during both pre- and post-independence periods. The colonial regime defined the
administrative structure in the 1960s by breaking the city down into 5 districts, and if adjoining
Matola is considered, 8 districts5 6. During colonialism the cement city (district 1) fell under the
municipal council, or Camara Municipal, which was highly centralized; municipal legislation came
from Lisbon (Grest, 1995). Peri urban Maputo (districts 2 through 8) was under a separate
administration, the rural or special "2nd administration", and was not considered a fundamental part of
Maputo. In fact, the Camara Municigalwas not designed to have the capacity or knowledge to deal
with peri-urban services and was only intended for the cement city (Pinsky, 1982). Although
intentions improved post-independence under Frelimo, the situation did not. The Camara Municigal
was replaced by the City Executive Council, but it was in effect 'captured', becoming a local arm of
the central state, a form of de-concentrated central administration at the local level (Grest, 1995).
Attempts were still made in the peri-urban areas to mobilize residents through "dynamizing groups"
to take charge of their bairro's welfare. However, the challenges were enormous and bairro residents
felt increasingly disregarded by the Frelimo party.
Peri-urban Maputo's political marginalization resulted in governance through social relations.
For example, socially based systems of land occupation have existed in urban areas of Mozambique
since the early period of colonial occupation. Although all land in Mozambique is currently
nationalized and the state's property, buying and selling in the land market takes place within a
network, often under a bairro chief's guidance; private ownership of land cannot be imposed from the
"top down" (Jenkins, 2001). Power in the hands of local chiefs without accountability has created its
own problems, namely corruption (Boucher, 1995). However, local elections in 1998 intended to
56 Districts are unofficially broken down into neighborhoods, or bairros, and bairros are broken down into block
groups, or quarteirio, but districts are the smallest official administrative unit.
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restructure government and create local level autonomy are not likely to solve Maputo's problems.
As of 2000, limited direct responsibilities and fiscal bases have been decentralized and local chiefs
remain the implicit neighborhood authorities (Jenkins, 2000).
5.9 CHALLENGES TO INCREASING COVERAGE IN MAPUTO
Since per unit cost of water is cheaper through a connection than at the standpipe it would
come as a surprise that poor households would choose not to connect to the network. However, this
is exactly what we see in many developing country cities worldwide. Capital for the connection fee,
fixed annual charges such as the meter fee, the need for a water holding device, and lack of flexible
payment mechanisms all create incentives for the poorest households to not connect (Bakker, 2005).
Another challenge often cited in the literature is property rights. Tenants, more than owners, find it
difficult to make infrastructure improvements on land that is not theirs. This could be a potential
problem for coverage in Maputo.
Many poor households are not landholders; they rent property. Renters have historically had
limited property rights in peri-urban Maputo. Although the government could not stop informal
settlements, it encouraged the use of straw and tin for housing construction so when settlements
were cleared for urban planning initiatives in the future, it could be done with ease and less waste
(Pinsky, 1982). This policy demonstrated that the government did not see these settlements as being
permanent, or even semi-permanent, and were reluctant to make costly investments like piped water
networks in these areas. Policy has changed since and taken a more positive tone with the Ministry
of Housing and Public Works (MOHP) attempting to "cope with informality and illegality" and turn
"the legitimate into the legal" (Jenkins, 2001).
Valuable improvements, such as a private water connection, complicate property rights in an
informal property market and weaken the landholder's ability to evict tenants, a common desire
when the housing market tightens (Boucher, 1995). Local leaders may be able to mediate disputes
between tenants and landlords, but corruption is a possibility and has been witnessed before
(Boucher, 1995). If tenants or providers have to pay bribes to local leaders or landlords, the cost of a
connection will rise considerably for households. However, according to our survey, up till now
ISNOs have not had to pay any formal or informal authority a bribe.
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Tenancy challenges coupled with FIPAG and AdM's de-emphasis of standpipes could
indirectly decrease coverage to the poorest residents. In the past, ISNOs have abandoned standpipes
because they were inconvenient or did not generate adequate absolute revenues - a typical provider
only generated 24 percent of monthly revenues from standpipe sales. However, standpipes are
profitable in relative terms - the 24 percent of revenue only came from 15 percent of all water sold57.
If the government encourages private connections and deemphasize standpipes it could lead to ISNOs
concentrating on profits from connections and mismanaging standpipes. Since the most expensive
labor cost - full-time paid labor - is reserved for standpipe management and labor costs currently
account for over 25 percent of recurrent costs, the incentives to cut corners around standpipes is
high 8.
CRA is a relatively weak institution in Maputo's water sector. Interim reviews of AdM are
possible but only under "exceptional circumstances"59 . CRA lacks effective penalty tools because
calling for an interim review is like citing a breach of contract, the equivalent of "launching a
missile'. According to one CRA official, "CRA must create a partnership environment with AdM; a
strict regulatory environment would create a breach of contract every month".
CRA faces three major challenges in regulating ISNOs in peri-urban Maputo. First, CRA has
limited human and financial resources capacity to deal with additional responsibilities, especially
those surrounding a new topic like SPSPs that it has no experience with; CRA was designed for global
regulation of the AdM contract, not the monitoring of multiple, daily operations (Thompson, 2005);
Second, CRA has little legitimacy in the peri-urban bairros where local chiefs are viewed as the only
legitimate authorities; this is rooted in the both city's history of colonial segregation (Jenkins, 1999)
and the current municipality's tacit acceptance of local chiefs' authority. Third, CRA is not very
confident about ISNOs' abilities to positively contribute towards sector goals. Despite these
challenges CRA acknowledges that the ISNO issue needs addressing and is moving ahead with a pilot
57 This revenue was calculated using the current price which is $0.06 for three jerricans. The difference between the
two figures narrows slightly when the price is changed to $0.04 cents for three jerricans like the partnership proposes,
but the revenue to sales volume ratio is still greater than 1.
58 This is yet another advantage to universal ISNO metering of private connections.
59 These exceptional circumstances can include 1) a change in the rate with respect to cost increases that cause AdM's
operating ratio to change by 30 percent or more. 2) Failure by FIPAG to invest properly in the capital investment
program that in turns causes AdM's operating revenue to fall by 2.5 percent or more.
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decentralized regulatory model in one peri-urban district (For a summary of the pilot project please
see Appendix C).
5.10 CONCLUSION AND ISSUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Portuguese colonial rule has left Maputo's water and sanitation infrastructure greatly
disadvantaged. A newly independent Mozambique lacked the financial and human resources
necessary to extend the utility network to peri-urban residents. Water coverage rates and service
levels could not keep up with population growth. Despite receiving a great deal of attention from
donor agencies and policymakers, large scale-private sector participation was unable to overcome
Maputo's infrastructure challenges. Today, less than 40 percent of Maputo residents have access to
the utility network through private connections or standpipes. Maputo's 'other private sector' - small
private-sector providers - serve over 150,000 residents with reliable standpipes and private
connections and have contributed significantly to coverage goals. Less was known, however, about
their cost and price structures, investment profiles, operational features, and how, if at all, they could
contribute to future sector goals.
We find that Maputo's SPSPs already contribute significantly to the sector's coverage, service,
and financial sustainability goals. They should be viewed as an integral part of Maputo's water
delivery system and not 'a problem' like much of the literature brands them. Their operations can be
made more efficient, affordable, and environmentally sustainable with the appropriate policy and
business interventions. We recommend actively promoting larger SPSPs, universal metering,
improved electricity supply, reducing costs associated with water pumps, and taxation and regulatory
measures so ISNOs can contribute to all sector goals as planning moves forward.
This study's recommendations raise new questions for Maputo's policymakers. Answers to
these questions could go a long-way in contributing to sector goals. This study cited evidence that
larger ISNOs were more capable of reducing costs than smaller ISNOs. One recommendation given
was for one ISNO to buy out another (or several) ISNO's market share. This would increase overall
sector efficiency. However, it is still unknown how this process would occur. How many smaller
providers are open to being bought out? Can the buyout occur between two negotiating parties using
market prices? Will the buyout process need the government's guidance to reduce transaction costs?
A new ISNO association process began in Maputo in the spring of 2005. Can this association take the
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lead in arranging mergers? Answering these questions will help determine what exact role the public
sector should plan in the buyout process.
This report recommends that ISNOs meter all their private connections. All parties stand to
gain from this service improvement. However, one study showed that those currently using
neighbors' connections were the most eager to have their own private connections (Hydroconseil,
2005). It needs to be determined whether this was a 'wealth effect', that is, are poorer residents who
use neighbors' connections more able to appreciate the benefits of a private connection and at the
same time unable to afford one? Or, are poorer residents bitter about having to use neighbors'
connections because of unfavorable neighborly or community relations? One study showed that
when peri-urban residents were asked if they thought their bairros were 'divided', Costa do Sol
residents felt that their bairro was more 'divided' than Hulene residents did (David, 2006).
Understanding community and neighborly relations in particular bairros can help determine which
bairros might pose greater challenges to the household resale strategy.
This study was unable to undertake a detailed market study of water pumps and pump motors
in Maputo. It is clear now that pumps pose burdensome costs on some providers operations.
Reducing these costs would be best achieved by understanding which company manufactures ISNOs'
pumps, why there is a high tariff on imported pumps when no Mozambican pump manufacturers
exist, why ISNOs are not buying pump motors with circuit breakers attached when such motors are
available, and if pump repair persons, which are plentiful, can also become pump salespersons, which
are in limited quantity.
One of the biggest challenges environmental economists face is determining a Pigovian tax
rate that will effectively curb an externality to an equilibrium point where both social welfare and
productive output are maximized. Determining the exact tax necessary will require a thorough
understanding of different areas' groundwater levels, the groundwater replenishment rate, sector
targets for household water consumption, and the capacity of ISNOs' to internalize the tax; in short,
the costs of saline intrusion versus the benefits of increased coverage and consumption.
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APPENDIX A:
A PROPOSED PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP IN PERI-URBAN MAPUTO
In recent years policymakers have come to realize the potential benefits of small water
providers. Their self-financed, financially sustainable operations quickly respond to demand and
tailor services to the poor. The poor are often the last to be served by urban utilities and policy
makers are under pressure to meet their own sector goals as well as the MDGs for water and
sanitation (W&S). At the same time policymakers often have to: 1) retain certain sector standards
with respect to water quality, service, and price and SPSPs may not currently be meeting them; and
2) if a lease or concession is involved, navigate a contract that stipulates only one seller within a pre-
negotiated selling area. One potential way to both reach the poor while maintaining sector or
contract requirements is to partner SPSPs with the existing utility. In the past this has involved the
utility selling water at a bulk rate to SPSPs who then deliver water onward to their customer base.
By requiring SPSPs to use utility water the government can better monitor water quality and satisfy
the utility. By formalizing SPSPs via a partnership policymakers can regulate price, service standards,
and impacts on the environment. Partnerships with SPSPs are a very recent phenomenon and it is
too early to draw concrete conclusions. Still, FIPAG has outlined a plan to partner ISNOs with AdM
in an effort to meet sector goals.
In 2004 FIPAG proposed a way to link AdM's network with the ISNOs to increase coverage
and service provision to peri-urban residents. There are two parts to the proposal, one for the current
edge of the utility network and one for areas where FIPAG/AdM do not envision themselves serving
for the next 10 to 15 years. At the network's edge, FIPAG will finance a new small network system
designed to modern standards that allow it to connect to a utility network and then lease the system
to an ISNO to connect customers, operate daily, and maintain. The small providers would purchase
utility water in bulk and resell it to households via a distribution network or standpipes. For those
areas where AdM does not foresee servicing in the near future, groundwater will be pumped into
tanks and then delivered with a mini grid like it is now. Leases would operate on five year contracts
where the ISNO would pay FIPAG a lease fee per cubic meter sold. ISNOs would be responsible for
financing new private connections and covering system depreciation. However, sales prices would be
set and enforced by the regulator.
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Fgure A. 1: The proposed FIPAG /SPSP lease arrangement
mIakQHS"
Source: Courtesy ofHydroconseil (2005)
Proposal documents indicate that small systems at the network's edge will result in increased
coverage, an affordable, safe, and reliable service, within a financially, environmentally, and
technically sustainable model. An output based aid (OBA) mechanism will help cover costs so that
households are only responsible for $41.50 of the connection cost, over 40 and 10 percent off a
current ISNO and AdM's connection cost, respectively; the remainder will be covered by African
Development Bank funds. Households demonstrated strong willingness to pay for a private
connection at this price. The OBA mechanism is intended as an incentive to providers to rapidly
increase coverage. Privately connected customers would receive water at a rate close to AdM's
current rate, which is 4 percent of two minimum monthly wages. Prices at standpipes would be
$0.69 a cubic meter, again within nationally recommended price limits. System infrastructure at the
network's edge will meet modern specifications, be able to source water from AdM's network, and
have a slated life expectancy of 20 years. Since "partners" would buy bulk water from AdM and sell it
onward, water quality will be equal to what current AdM customers receive. Providers with
extensive water system management experience are being sought out to manage the 60 small systems
with the hope that they will continue 24 hour service, responding rapidly to connection requests, and
provide attentive customer service. They are expected to manage close to 150 connections per system
at the start, with a standpipe connection ratio of 1 to 50. Where FIPAG does not see itself extending
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the network in at least the next ten years, ISNOs will be built a small system similar to the kind they
have now and made responsible for connecting clients and continuing to deliver water while
adhering to price and quality regulations by CRA.
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APPENDIX B:
A COMPETITION SIMULATION MODEL BETWEEN MAPUTO'S ISNOs AND THE UTILITY
If independent small network operators (ISNO) decide to compete with Aguas de
Mogambique (AdM) rather than enter a partnership, they could reduce their prices and as a group
present formidable competition to the large, private operator. In a simulated model we find that: 1)
ISNOs can compete with AdM on price; 2) if service quality does not suffer as a result of lower prices
then the service they provide will be as favorable as AdM's; 3) ISNOs will retain their existing
customer base but will not gain new households because the cost to connect to their system is 60
percent higher than the cost to connect to AdM's; and 4) lower ISNO profits due to lower prices will
make the market unattractive to new entrepreneurs resulting in slower ISNO growth. Because
AdM's prices are lower than ISNOs', many believe customers will naturally shift towards AdM.
However, if ISNOs are left to their own devices, they may be able to compete with AdM as it begins
to distribute water in peri-urban Maputo towards the end of the decade.
Currently the AdM price for 10 cubic meters of water, including the meter rental fee, is less
than half of what ISNOs charge ($3.55 versus $8.30); The price for a 20 liter jerrican is anywhere
between being equal to a half. However, there is a transaction cost associated with switching to
AdM. Currently SPSP customers walk a few blocks and pay at the provider's home. With AdM
service, as a worst case scenario, there is the cost of travel and of having to take time out of income
generating activities to pay the monthly bill. Many customers would have to travel to the AdM office
downtown to pay. The current minimum wage in Mozambique is $40.00 a month. Assuming it takes
half a day to pay the bill (long lines have been witnessed outside the AdM building), the transaction
would cost an additional $1.66 per month, $0.62 in travel and $1.04 in lost income / time. There is
also the cost of a new connection that is about $48.00. Because of uncertainty surrounding the
connection charge and to keep the model simple, this switching cost will be ignored; in reality this is
likely to favor the ISNO. The above specifications and assumptions result in a final AdM monthly
charge of $5.21.
If ISNOs want to compete with AdM their monthly water treatment costs will have to rise.
Although customers are satisfied with ISNO water now, they may lose households to AdM if it can
guarantee their families a safe water supply. Therefore, ISNOs will have to spend an additional $9.40
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a month on chemicals 60 to treat their water. Everything else is assumed to remain as it was at the
time of the survey, including all other recurrent costs, sales volume of water, number of customers
served, location, etc. Taking into account the extra chemical treatment costs, we reanalyze the
ISNOs' working ratios using AdM prices.
The model sets the ISNO's price equal to the AdM price that includes the transaction cost
assumptions made above. The new provider price for 1 cubic meter of water is $0.52 ($5.21 / 10), the
new flat monthly fee is set equal to $5.20, and all providers adopt the bulk jerrican discount of 3
jerricans for $0.04. If providers adopt these prices and their monthly chemical costs increase by
$9.40, all else equal, the new average working ratio becomes 0.59. On average the model increased
ISNOs' working ratio by 34 percent but the new ratio is still well under the break-even point of 1.00.
When considering actual prices and costs, 3 percent of providers have a working ratio of 1.00 or
higher and are in danger of failing versus a slightly higher 9 percent of providers when we consider
lower prices and increased chemical costs.
If providers are still paying their capital costs back the working ratio becomes .94 and 35
percent of providers are in danger of failing. However, this is not considered to be realistic because of
our 8 year capital pay back assumption. AdM will begin selling by 2009 at which point the majority
of providers will have existed for 9 years; they will have paid their capital back by the time they
lower prices to compete with AdM. In fact, one external source cites providers paying capital costs
back as quickly as two years after an operation has begun (Hydroconseil, 2005).
This experiment has limitations but it has demonstrated that SPSPs will not necessarily
rapidly lose their customer base in the face AdM's lower prices alone. The model is based on self-
reported figures of volume sales averaged across the dry season and rest of the year. We asked
providers to estimate their volume sales for these two seasons, however, the survey was conducted in
January when demand is high and providers may be recalling their most recent volume sales data.
However, this is potentially offset by the model's use of conservative assumptions that do not take
into account the new AdM connection cost deterrent and the fact that peri-urban families may prefer
60 This is the current sample average for monthly spending on chemicals.
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the per cubic meter charge of SPSPs to the minimum 10 cubic meter charge levied by AdM6 1.
Although providers may have a difficult time increasing their customer base because connecting to an
ISNO is more costly than connecting to AdM, they very well may retain their existing customer base
and continue operating if they make the proper price adjustments. This would give operating
advantage to the largest ISNOs, who make $395 more per month on average than small providers62 .
61 See the following for a more detailed discussion on this topic: Ehrhardt, David. (2000). Impact of Market Structure
on Service Options for the Poor. Conference on Infrastructure for Development: Private Solutions and the Poor.
London, UK.
62 Results are significant at the 95 percent confidence level based on net monthly profits; a large provider is defined as
50 household connections or more.
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APPENDIX C:
A MICRO-REGULATORY PILOT PROJECT IN PERI-URBAN MAPUTO
CRA is moving forward with a "micro" or "decentralized" regulatory plan that uses local
chiefs and community organizations in conjunction with CRA's office to regulate ISNOs at the local
level. Existing community based organizations will be the indirect regulators of ISNOs and the voice
of the poor to local existing Water Committees (WC) who have historically overseen W&S issues in
the bairros. These water committees will then report to CRA:
Complaints- Customers -- Community orgs 4 WCs (with bairro chiefs) + CRA
One problem with this model is it was built off an existing standpipe management pilot project that
has had multiple failures including lack of interest from AdM. AdM showed little interest because
standpipes were one of its tertiary concerns; since it was the key player the project was delayed for
close to a year. FIPAG was preoccupied with contract renegotiation following SAUR International's
departure in 2000 and could not enforce AdM's compliance (Thompson, 2005). This is not likely to
repeat itself with ISNOs because all parties have a strong interest in ISNO issues. However, perhaps
too much faith was put into the water committees who could not fulfill their role as institutional
liaison and local regulator.
Maputo's municipality created water committees about 15 years ago and thus they make for
attractive social capital to build projects around. However, this may be preventing CRA and other
institutions from exploring alternative regulatory or monitoring mechanisms. In the standpipe
management pilot program, WCs did not function well as communicators, were not tied closely to
CRA - some have not even heard of the agency, and were barely held accountable by the
municipality. This could be because some, like the dynamizing groups of the 1980s, fell inactive for
periods of time. Because of the weak information flow from WCs to CRA, policymakers might
consider restricting ISNO activity through another existing institution - bairro and district level
licensing schemes.
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In the standpipe model, WCs were ineffective because they had weak linkages with CRA and
were unable to communicate with institutional agencies properly. However, if they restricted their
activity to within the bairro they might be more effective. Water committees could enforce that 1)
taxes are collected by the bairro administration; and 2) use their comparative advantage in voicing
community concerns to ensure that collected taxes go directly towards borehole protection to avoid
nitrate and microbial contamination or community education around water quality and
environmental safety. Water committees then could become accountable to CRA, instead of the
municipality who has shown little interest in enforcement in the past and continues to be a weak
institutional actor. This would reverse the flow of responsibility, putting the onus on CRA to ensure
that WCs are monitoring the bairro administration and ensuring that public revenues are targeted
properly.
Monitoring CRA 4 WCs 4 Bairro administrations 4 ISNOs
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APPENDIX D:
ADDITIONAL INDEPENDENT SMALL NETwORK PHOTOGRAPHS
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